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Essays
The Next Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor
by
PETER B. EDELMAN*
As we celebrate two centuries of American constitutional history, a
concurrent milestone is the half century that has passed since the
Supreme Court's "switch in time" finally validated regulatory legislation
to protect workers in a variety of ways.1 Scholars and activists on the
right have certainly noticed this concurrent anniversary, and have called
for a return to an early twentieth century reading of the Constitution
under which constitutional property and contract protection would be
read as invalidating much of the modern regulatory apparatus.2 Such
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1. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
2. Eg., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980). Seeing
what these scholars propose to use judicial activism to do is almost enough (but not quite) to
turn a "liberal" activist into an advocate of judicial restraint. Their constitutional axe would
cut a wide swath, including in its path most if not all of the transfer payment programs which
this Essay argues are inadequate. E.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra, at 306-29. It should be noted,
though, that while the substantive views of the "left" and "right" judicial activists are in polar
opposition, they share a curious parallelism of position as to the court's institutional role
which perhaps ought to give pause to both. See Newest JudicialActivists Come From the Right,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, at E24, col. 4. Other activists of the right are arguing that the Court
also erred 50 years ago in interpreting the spending power to strengthen Congress' leverage
over the states. A recent report from a Task Force chaired by Assistant Attorney General
advocates can, of course, take heart because the Court has overruled
longstanding doctrines on other occasions. The lesson from a half cen-
tury of economic policy experience within the constitutional framework
created by the Roosevelt Court is, however, if anything, diametrically
opposed to the one presently being drawn by the revisionists of the right.
Subsequent history teaches that the Roosevelt Court did not go far
enough in assuring minimum economic protection for individual citizens.
For all the injustices and inequalities that persist in American soci-
ety, none is more serious than the continuing poverty of millions in the
midst of the greatest affluence any country has ever known. This injus-
tice continues despite a national declaration more than two decades ago
of a "War on Poverty." It is therefore appropriate in celebrating our
constitutional bicentennial to consider anew the existence of a constitu-
tional right to some form of minimum income.
The question received attention from scholars in the late 1960s and
the 1970s, 3 but is worth reexamining because the condition of the poor
has deteriorated alarmingly since 1978. It was perhaps arguable then, as
Robert Bork in fact did argue, that the poor had done pretty well legisla-
tively and needed no special judicial protection. 4 But what has occurred
since demonstrates pointedly the poor's continuing political powerless-
ness and suggests again the value of considering judicial intervention.
Moreover, examination of the scholarly debate with the benefit of some
passage of time reveals theoretical approaches not fully explored in the
earlier exchanges.
5
Charles Cooper called for a return to states' rights with an analysis that is conceptually akin to
the public-private upheaval which Epstein and Siegan are advocating. Study Urges Fight for
States'Power, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1986, at Al, col.l.
3. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 573-74, 1117 (1978) [herein-
after L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in
the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Fore-
word: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7
(1969); Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of
Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973) [hereinafter Michelman, One View of Rawls];
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659; Winter,
Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41; Winter,
Changing Concepts of Equality; From Equality Before the Law to the Welfare State, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 741.
4. Bork, supra note 3, at 701.
5. Charles Black, for example, recently drew on the ninth amendment, the Declaration
of Independence, the preamble to the Constitution, and the general welfare clause to argue for
a right to "livelihood." Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986). By contrast, it is instructive to reread Charles Reich's path-
breaking article on the subject, written in 1965. At that time the challenge was to break down
the prevailing view that welfare in statutory form was merely charity rather than a legislatively
created right to which protection of various kinds attached. Only at the end of the article does
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The present Supreme Court will surely not adopt the ideas advanced
in this Essay.6 Indeed, this particular Court has essentially already re-
jected them.7 But since there is little prospect of early, massive legisla-
tive intervention, and assuming that this will remain the situation, the
intellectual groundwork for judicial participation should be laid anyway
against the day when a more amenable Court is in place.
The argument I make in this Essay is for a constitutional right to a
"survival" income, or if that term seems too elementally biological, the
idea of a "subsistence" income may communicate my meaning more
clearly. I have chosen this terminology to indicate that I am not arguing
for a court-ordered end to "poverty." The latter would raise difficult
definitional and remedial questions, as the following discussion will
show. On the other hand, I do not mean survival in the literal sense of
confining the claim to people who will starve or die of exposure without a
court order. If there is a societal obligation to assure survival, I believe it
is at a more generous level than a bed in a homeless shelter and meals at
a soup kitchen. Again, I am talking about subsistence. How one might
define it further is discussed more fully in section III below.
It may help to envision the question of subsistence income coming
before the Supreme Court when the Court once again has a "liberal"
majority, although I would stress that I believe the argument I make is
doctrinally justified right now. It might sharpen my argument to sup-
pose as well that the situation of the poor will have deteriorated further
by that time because of a continuing increase in unemployment stemming
from international competition and automation and because income
maintenance payments have lost further ground to inflation, so that an
even greater percentage of the population is poor and the poor are even
more deeply in poverty.
Hypothesizing a factual situation more desperate than the current
predicament makes it easier to argue that there are constitutional rights
which have been violated in that the issue will more clearly be that of
Reich consider the idea of entitlement, and even then he merely argues that the poor have as
much of a claim on the legislature for subsidy as do other interest groups. Much of the change
in legal perspective for which Reich argued has since occurred, making it plausible to advance
the argument put forth herein. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerg-
ing Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.. 1245, 1255-56 (1965).
6. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 265 (1985); L.TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 3, at 574; Michelman, One View of Rawls, supra note 3, at 966.
7. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-
77 (1977); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549-51 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74
(1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141-43 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
487 (1970).
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basic subsistence and it will be easier to show that the government has
acted impermissibly in the degree to which it has created and perpetu-
ated severe poverty. It also suggests a plausible and legitimizing institu-
tional and political reason why the Court might be willing to intervene in
a matter which otherwise "feels" so legislative in nature. Of course, mere
legislative inactivity creates no basis for judicial intervention unless there
is a constitutional right which has been violated.8
I hasten to add, and I will argue in detail later, that a judicially
imposed solution-even the partially judicial solution which the idea of a
"survival" income necessarily entails-is a most inadequate way to pro-
ceed. But court intervention becomes essential in the face of a legislative
impasse blocking vindication of the constitutional rights in question.
Such an impasse already exists, and judicial intervention should not have
to wait but would be justified at present, unlikely as such intervention is
in reality.
What is the constitutional argument, in brief?
My basic point is that the past half century has brought us to a need
for a new constitutional era,9 one presaged by intimations in existing doc-
trine but admittedly a step or more beyond where we have been, an era
which involves judicial recognition of certain affirmative obligations on
the part of the state to its citizens.
8. But once there is a constitutional right involved, there is "a presumption in favor of
the judicial enforceability of constitutional rights .... " L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES,
supra note 6, at 111-12, quoting the Court's restatement in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
242 (1979) of its Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), decision. The Court continued:
At least in the absence of a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of an
issue to a coordinate political department, we presume that justiciable constitutional
rights are to be enforced through the courts. And, unless such rights are to become
merely precatory, the class of those litigants who allege that their own constitutional
rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other
than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdic-
tion of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.
Tribe also makes the related point that constitutionally recognized rights must be dealt with in
article III courts rather than some other type of tribunal. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES, supra note 6, at 94 (citing Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)). Not all
authorities agree with the Davis v. Passman formulation. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-76, 263 (1980).
9. I take it as a given that our constitutional theory and doctrine have evolved over time
and can continue to evolve. To use Ronald Dworkin's apt distinction, many rights which we
recognize today as part of due process or equal protection were not specifically part of the
framers' "conception" when the fifth and later the fourteenth amendments were promulgated,
but can be appropriately regarded as part of, or consistent with, their "concept." R. DWOR-
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977). Obviously this position, while widely shared
and implicitly (if not explicitly) endorsed by the Supreme Court for at least the better part of a
century, is not universally shared. Full examination of that debate is beyond the scope of the
purpose of this Essay.
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There are two lines of theoretical justification for this: one, that it is
an obligation which has been implicit in our constitutional structure all
along, or at least since the American polity has had enough resources to
share its wealth more equitably; and two, that it is an obligation which
has been acquired as a consequence of the government's historic and con-
tinuing complicity in economic arrangements that foreseeably resulted in
the current maldistribution. The first is a substantive due process argu-
ment; the second is an equal protection theory.
The framers surely did not contemplate any constitutional right to
any degree of redistribution, however modest. They thought of them-
selves as protecting property rights and interests as distributed at the
time. Any notion that effective political participation required economic
fairness was irrelevant because suffrage was limited to the propertied.
Indeed, it is precisely this recognition of the economic and therefore the
political realities of the late eighteenth century that underscores why a
narrow jurisprudence of original intent is unacceptable and unworkable.
The constitutional premises of 1789, even as modified by the post-Civil
War amendments, were based on protecting a propertied, wealthy class.
That we still have the same governing document without the same origi-
nal premises is the reason why arguments of the kind made in this Essay
can be advanced and ultimately win acceptance.
The Court further compounded the constitutional plight of the dis-
possessed during the Lochner i0 era. An activist conservative Court, by
using notions of freedom of contract to strike down state efforts at regu-
lation to protect workers, ensured continued exploitation and gross mal-
distribution of income.
That the Lochner era ended as the country struggled with the conse-
quences of the Great Depression was no accident. By that time, as Lau-
rence Tribe has put it so well, "[n]o longer could it be argued with great
conviction that the invisible hand of economics was functioning simulta-
neously to protect individual rights and produce a social optimum."' 1
What occurred with the "switch in time" in 1937 was what Bruce
Ackerman calls "the constitutional vindication of the activist welfare
state."' 2 Whether one's view is that the Court was rediscovering a view
of Congress' power set forth over a century earlier by Chief Justice John
Marshall,' 3 or stating a "new constitutional principle," as Ackerman
10. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 446.
12. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1052 (1984).
13. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Justice Jackson described Chief
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would have it, 14 there is no question but that the "switch in time" radi-
cally altered the path which the Court had followed for a half a century
or more. Either way, the Court was altering the previously perceived
balance between state power and individualistic principles in the eco-
nomic sphere. The Court recognized that the state has the power to take
steps to protect individual citizens from economic exploitation.
That declaration by the Court, together with the array of legislation
which it invited and the explosion of economic growth following World
War II, had enormous positive effects. Still, another half century later,
we need to be aware that the hopes associated with the new constitu-
tional balance of the late 1930s have fallen short of fulfillment. One third
of a nation ill-housed, ill-clothed, and ill-fed has diminished to one-sixth
of a nation, but it is not getting any smaller. Indeed, the fundamental
point of this Essay is that we as a nation have not faced up to the exist-
ence of this impasse. We have failed to confront this impasse in our na-
tional consciousness and therefore in our politics, our legislation, and our
constitutional theory and doctrine.
We came out of World War II with a determination that we would
never have another Great Depression and a faith, borne out in general
over the next twenty-five years, that we could now pursue a path of pros-
perity. Our sense of inexorable progress was buoyed by the distinct steps
taken toward racial justice in the sixties. But the economy has been
largely stagnant for a decade and a half, with little growth in real income.
If we ever believed the so-called war on poverty of the sixties would end
poverty, the numbers should tell us that we lost that particular war a
long time ago. The promise of the sixties that progress in vindicating
legal rights for blacks would be followed by progress in remedying eco-
nomic inequities for all was never fulfilled. In its place we hear cries,
mostly negative versions of the age-old saying that the poor will always
be with us, and the newer, related "wisdom" that government programs
do not work.
Economic growth is, of course, critically important. A rising tide
does lift all boats-somewhat. Demographics-the reduced number of
young people entering the labor force for the next ten years-will help
firm up wages at the low end of the labor market. What we have not
Justice Marshall's view of federal power in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)
(citation omitted): "At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce
power with a breadth never yet exceeded. He made emphatic the embracing and penetrating
nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from the
political rather than from the judicial processes."
14. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1056.
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faced up to, though, is that the poor will always be with us unless we put
additional policies in place. Indeed, I would question whether we really
have had the "activist welfare state" to which Ackerman refers. Our
faith has been placed primarily in the rising tide theory. This policy has
been the major focus of our post-World War II ethos as to how to spread
economic prosperity among all our people. But our belief that economic
growth can end poverty without accompanying attention to structural
and distributional policy should now be recognized as unsupportable.
The public policies that need to be adopted should be promulgated
primarily by legislation, for reasons I will elaborate in greater detail later.
The question here is whether there is any appropriate role for the Court.
I think there is. The Court has staked out little new economic
ground in half a century. Thirty years ago, in response to an evolving
sense of injustice (though hardly majoritarian at the time), it broke new
ground on racial matters. But it has taken no fundamentally different
stance on distributional issues since the late 1930s. The Court's leap for-
ward in the economic sphere at that time was propelled by a realization
that it was ridiculous to keep on saying people had a right to be ex-
ploited. State intervention to prevent exploitation was therefore
sanctioned.
Half a century later it is palpable that the legislative arrangements of
the 1930s, which were first judicially rejected and later approved, have
accomplished a great deal but have proved insufficient to end the victimi-
zation entirely. Since judicial intervention to permit legislative interven-
tion to alleviate "the misery of underpaid, overburdened, or unemployed
workers," in Laurence Tribe's phrase, has not sufficiently ameliorated the
conditions which were "a product of conscious governmental deci-
sions,"15 again to use Tribe's language, the next step is judicial interven-
tion to require legislative intervention. If the purpose of the "switch in
time" was to unleash legislative action to improve economic outcomes, it
has been only partially successful. A half century of evidence suggests it
is time for a new remedial thrust, which declares that government has an
affirmative obligation to assure its citizens enough income to subsist,
based alternatively on either the very structure of the Constitution as the
compact that creates our American community or on government's ac-
tion in helping to create the severe poverty that persists amid our
affluence.
The constitutional argument is not the end of the discussion in this
Essay. Three further points will follow. First, although the Court could
15. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 447.
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act, it would be far more desirable if it did not have to. What is required,
beyond provision of a base survival income, to deal with poverty in any
sense is very complicated and well beyond the capacity of a court to
frame, let alone implement. Legislative action would be much more ap-
propriate and, of course, legislators have taken an oath to uphold the
Constitution, too. Second, judicial intervention should be pursued even
though it cannot produce a complete antipoverty strategy, since legisla-
tive action in adequate measure is not foreseeable. Third, and finally,
litigators should continue to pursue pieces of relief under state constitu-
tions, to build a record and a climate for both Supreme Court and legisla-
tive intervention (as well as for the intrinsic value of the relief obtained in
the state courts).
In summary, the purpose of this Essay is to articulate a constitu-
tional framework for thinking about poverty, or at least "survival,"
which goes beyond a legislative agenda and accompanying strategies.
Thus, the purpose is not merely to discuss constitutional theory, but also
to examine the symbiotic relationship between the Court and Congress
on the issue, and to explore briefly both the relationship between the
Court and the states and the relationship between the states themselves.
To the extent that there is a constitutional obligation to provide some
measure of economic security, it extends, of course, to all who take an
oath of office to support and defend the Constitution, so the constitu-
tional arguments herein have implications in that regard as well.
I. The Facts: The Poor Are Getting Poorer
There was, arguably, less reason to search for a constitutional right
a decade ago than there is today. The percentage of people who were
poor had steadily decreased through the 1960s until 1973 and had re-
mained essentially steady from then until 1978.16 The severe deteriora-
tion since provides evidence to support the need for the "survival" idea
discussed below and for the necessity of the Court becoming a partici-
pant. At the same time, however, examination of the facts will lay the
groundwork for another point made later, that a complete antipoverty
strategy cannot possibly emanate from a judicial decree.
Over the past eight years there has been a visible and measurable
increase in the number of people who are so poor that they have great
difficulty in obtaining basic necessities of survival like shelter and food.
What is visible, of course, is the increase in the ranks of the homeless and
the hungry. In every major city the scores of people sleeping in parks
16. See infra text accompanying notes 30-33.
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and on grates have increased. Facilities providing overnight shelter have
appeared everywhere, and are often unable to serve all who need a place
to sleep. Every television network has repeatedly dramatized, on the
news and in documentaries, the increase in hunger. It is evident that the
homeless are not merely disturbed people who are not getting appropri-
ate mental health services, but also now include significant numbers of
families with children.
The Reagan Administration places the number of homeless people
at 250,000 to 350,000, while private advocates argue that the correct
number is between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000.17 The U.S. Conference of
Mayors surveyed eighty-three cities and found that the demand for emer-
gency shelter went up 71.3 percent from 1982 to 1983.18 A 1985 U.S.
Conference of Mayors survey of twenty-one cities found that emergency
food facilities were unable to meet the demand in fifteen of them.19 The
Food Research and Action Center found that, nationwide, the demand
for emergency food supplies went up by twenty percent from 1983 to
1984, a period following the most recent recession.20 At the end of 1986
the U.S. Conference of Mayors reported that the demand for shelter had
increased that year in twenty-five cities by an average of yet another
twenty percent.
21
A. What Is 'Poverty"?
The foregoing is, unfortunately, just the tip of the iceberg. To un-
derstand more fully the degree of the deterioration, one must begin with
an understanding of how poverty is measured. The poverty "line" was
established in 1959 by taking the cost of what the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture then called the "economy food plan" (itself a lower
cost diet than the "minimum standard diet") and multiplying it by
three.22 A few years later the number was indexed to annual changes in
17. See Hearings, The Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis, Comm. on Government
Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1984) (statement of Jo-
seph Delfico, General Accounting Office) (smaller figure); COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENT OP-
ERATIONS, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE HOMELESS CRISIS, H.R. REP. NO. 47, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985) (arger figure).
18. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS AND THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF CITY HUMAN SER-
VICE OFFICIALS, THE URBAN POOR AND THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY: A SURVEY OF HUMAN
SERVICES IN THE NATION'S PRINCIPAL CITIES 26 (1984).
19. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE STATUS OF HUNGER IN CITIES 1 (1985).
20. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, SMALLER SLICES OF THE PIE 16
(1985).
21. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE CONTINUED GROWTH OF HUNGER, HOME-
LESSNESS AND POVERTY IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1986, at 1 (1986).
22. Census and Designation of Poverty and Income: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
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the rate of inflation rather than an annual recalculation of the cost of the
economy food plan. 23 The level of income necessary to escape poverty
was deliberately understated at the start,2 4 so, by definition, that under-
statement was locked in by indexation. 25
The income measured for purposes of the poverty line is cash, before
taxes. Thus, income for poverty-measurement purposes includes cash
assistance like Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) but
excludes food stamps, medical assistance, and public housing. 26 For peo-
ple who work, income is measured before taxes of any kind are paid.
27
Thus, if an income of $8,277 was the "true" poverty boundary for a fam-
ily of three in 1984,28 somewhat fewer recipients of food stamps, Medi-
caid, and other noncash transfers were poor than the official numbers
show (and others were still poor, but less so), while more people with
jobs were effectively poor than the official numbers show (a family of four
on Census and Population of the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, and the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8,
11, 14 (1984) (testimony of Mollie Orshansky) [hereinafter Joint Hearing on Poverty and In-
come]. The factor of three was based on surveys by the Bureau of Census done in 1955 which
showed that the "economy food plan" would cost approximately one-third of the median
household budget for a family of three. Ms. Orshansky testified that "in choosing the lowest
food plan that the Agriculture Department had .... as in choosing the so-called multiplier that
I did and that I got approved, I thought.., that it was better to maybe understate the need."
Id. at 11.
23. Id. at 15-16. The indexing of the poverty rate to the Consumer Price Index was a
compromise made in 1969. At that time, Ms. Orshansky and the head of her group in the
Social Security Administration, Mrs. Marion, decided that the poverty line should be raised to
compensate for changes in food budget patterns reflected in a 1965 survey conducted by the
Census Bureau. They first asked the permission of the Office of Management and Budget and
the Council of Economic Advisers and were told, "You can't change it [the poverty line]; it is
no longer yours." Id. at 15. The indexing was a compromise.
24. See supra note 22.
25. Even if the original poverty line in 1959 was realistic, its counterpart today is if any-
thing too low, since the costs of shelter, home heating and health care for the poor have in-
creased at rates exceeding the rate of inflation. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES, supra note 20, at 39; Joint Hearing on Poverty and Income, supra note 22, at 14.
26. Joint Hearing on Poverty and Income, supra note 22, at 8-9; R. PLOTNICK & F. SKID-
MORE, PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: A REVIEW OF THE 1964-1974 DECADE 34 (1975).
27. Plotnick and Skidmore note that disposable cash income (net income after all taxes)
is a more exact measure for two reasons. It would take into consideration tax increases and
eliminate inequalities between those who earn taxable income (wages) and those who receive
nontaxable income (such as social security benefits). R. PLOTNICK & F. SKIDMORE, supra
note 26, at 34. However, pretax income was and is used for a good reason-there is no reliable
after-tax income series that can presently be used to define poverty statistically. Joint Hearing
on Poverty and Income, supra note 22, at 8.
28. The poverty line for a family of four in 1984 was $10,609. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON
PROGRAM WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 54 (Comm.
Print 1986) [hereinafter STAFF OF HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM.].
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with one full-time worker and wages at the poverty line was paying a
little over ten percent of its income in federal income and payroll taxes in
1984).29 The realities vary by region as well, due to differences in shelter
costs. More people are effectively poor than officially so in New York
City, while the opposite is the case in Mississippi.
B. Trends in Poverty
From 1959, when the counting of poor people began in the United
States, the percentage of Americans who were poor dropped steadily un-
til 1973, from 22.4 percent to 11.1 percent. 30 From that year until 1978
the changes were mainly cyclical, reflecting the severe recession of 1974-
1975, but ending with a poverty rate of 11.4 percent, not much different
from 1973.31 After 1978 the rate began a steady upward trend until it
peaked at 15.3 percent in 1983, and then dropped back slightly in 1984
and 1985, ending at fourteen percent. 32 The 1985 figure represented 33.1
million people, compared with 24.5 million in 1978 (and 23.1 million in
1973).33 The arithmetic is obvious, but it is nonetheless worth emphasiz-
ing that 8.6 million more people were poor in 1985 than in 1978, a thirty-
five percent increase.
Further, a major shift has occurred in the composition of the poor,
with major decreases occurring in poverty among the elderly and dispro-
portionate increases occurring among the nonelderly. As a consequence
of the indexing of Social Security and the enactment of the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program, the percentage of the elderly who are
poor has dropped dramatically, from 35.2 percent in 1959 to 12.4 percent
in 1984,34 so that the elderly are now somewhat less poor than the popu-
lation as a whole (although subgroups of the elderly such as blacks, His-
panics, women, and the very old are still disproportionately poor). By
contrast, poverty among families with children, especially single-parent
families (which are largely female-headed), has skyrocketed. The child
poverty rate has climbed from 13.8 percent in 1969 to twenty percent in
29. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 20, at 33-35. Census data
show that in 1983, 2.6 million people were pushed below the poverty line when taxes were
taken out of their paychecks. Id.
30. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME AND POV-
ERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE U.S.: 1984, at 21 (Series P-60, No. 149,
Aug. 1985).
31. Id.
32. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME AND POV-
ERTY STUTUS OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE U.S,: 1985, at 22 (Series P-60, No. 154,
Aug. 1986).
33. Id.
34. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 30, at 21.
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1984.35 In 1959, 26.3 percent of the poor lived in female-headed families;
in 1984 the figure was 48.8 percent.3 6 Translating this to children, more
than half of all poor children live in female-headed families, and more
than half of all children in female-headed families are poor.37 The
phrase, the "feminization of poverty," is dramatized by these figures,
although that phrase masks the drastic accompanying deterioration in
the situation among children.
The poor are getting poorer as well. Nearly two out of five (37.9
percent) persons lived in families with incomes below half the poverty
line in 1984, compared to a third in 1980 and less than thirty percent in
1975.38 This percentage figure, which perhaps sounds a bit abstract,
translates to nearly thirteen million people. For a family of four, existing
with an income below half the poverty line meant living on less than
$5,300 in 1984; for a family of three this meant existing on less than
$4,150. The number of families with income below $5,000, adjusted for
inflation, rose thirty-nine percent between 1978 and 1984. 39 The median
income of two-member and three-member poverty families was approxi-
mately two-thirds of the poverty line in 1984.' 0 In other words, some-
thing like half the poor had incomes of less than 66.7 percent of the
poverty line.
Given all these figures, the phenomenon of increased homelessness,
now extending to large numbers of families with children, is far more
understandable, especially in light of the increasing scarcity of low-in-
come housing and the consequent increase in rents which has far out-
stripped the general rate of inflation. A constitutional "right to survival"
may seem more plausible once the foregoing figures are digested.
C. Why Has Poverty Increased?
Why did these huge increases in poverty among the nonelderly oc-
cur? One theory currently receiving a good deal of notoriety is that "wel-
fare" causes poverty, and that if AFDC, food stamps, and other welfare
programs were ended, people would stop being dependent on the govern-
ment, would have to go out and work, and, presumably, would no longer
35. Id.
36. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 20, at 12.
37. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1984, at 84, 86 (Series P-60, No. 152, June
1986).
38. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 20, at 15.
39. Id.
40. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 30, at 89, 122.
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be poor.
41
It is important to understand that in its extreme form this argument
is nonsense. Welfare is surely a factor which does contribute to chronic
dependency among some of its recipients, but chronic welfare recipients
represent a minority among the poor and other factors contribute to the
persistency of their dependency. There are two major reasons why so
many more nonelderly people are poor: problems with the general health
of the economy and a deterioration in the real value of transfer payments.
There are fewer jobs available now, relative to the number of people
who want to work. Unemployment at the depth of each recession and
the peak of each recovery since 1970 has been higher than it was at the
previous nadir or zenith. The economy performed admirably in creating
new jobs in the 1970s, with the number of people working rising from
82.8 million in 1970 to 106.9 million in 1980.42 But there was a huge
influx of new workers during the decade, including baby-boomers, wo-
men, and immigrants (both legal and illegal). The economy was simply
unable to keep up.
Therefore, in April of 1986, in the midst of a recovery, unemploy-
ment was still 7.1 percent, a figure representing 8.3 million people. In
addition, 1.1 million were counted as so discouraged they have stopped
looking for work and 5.9 million were working part-time only because
they could not find full-time work.43 In total there were not 8.3 million
but 15.3 million who were either unemployed or involuntarily underem-
ployed. Not all these people were poor, of course. Many of the 8.3 mil-
lion were only temporarily between jobs, but 1.1 million had been
unemployed over six months.44 And, largely due to congressional reduc-
tions in the scope of the unemployment compensation system, only 28.7
percent were receiving unemployment compensation in April 198645 as
opposed to seventy-five percent during the recession of 1974-1975.46
Given that there are and for some time have been about fifteen mil-
lion more people who want to work full-time than there are full-time jobs
41. See, ag., C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984).
42. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR as cited in COUNCIL OF ECO-
NOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 266 (Feb. 1986).
43. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NEWS, THE UNEMPLOY-
MENT SITUATION: APRIL 1986 (May 2, 1986).
44. Id.
45. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Housing of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986) (statement of John Bickerman, Research
Director, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities).
46. Id.
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available, it stands to reason that the number of people who remain on
welfare even though they could get a job is relatively small.
The softening of the economy, with the effect it has had in creating a
trend of increasing unemployment, is one cause of increasing poverty.
The changes in the economy have also brought about an increase in the
number of people who work but do not earn enough to get out of pov-
erty. Their numbers now exceed seven million, having increased by more
than sixty percent since 1978.47 Nearly two-thirds of the heads of
nonelderly poor families work at some point during the year.48 Over two
million people work full-time year-round and are still poor 49 (with de-
pendents, this figure represents 6.4 million people, or nineteen percent of
the poor). The phenomena of increased unemployment and the softening
of wages at the low end of the scale are, of course, related to one another.
With so much unemployment, employers do not have to bid strenuously
to hire unskilled labor. Not surprisingly in light of these facts, the age of
entry into the labor force has been creeping upward, and the wages of
entry-level workers have deteriorated in their purchasing power.50 This
accentuates poverty among young parents and therefore among children.
Another factor behind the increase in the number of working poor is
the erosion of the minimum wage. The last adjustment to it, voted dur-
ing the Carter years, took effect in January 1981, and has since lost
twenty-five percent of its value to inflation. Consequently, any family of
two or more which has one wage earner receiving the minimum wage as
its sole source of income will be in poverty.5 1
Where does welfare fit into all of this? About 10.8 million people
are receiving AFDC,52 the main cash program for families with children.
These families typically receive food stamps as well. Between 1970 and
1985 AFDC, which is not indexed for inflation, lost thirty-three percent
in real value on the average around the nation.53 No state-not one--
47. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 20, at 13.
48. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 30, at 28.
49. Id. at 27.
50. "Between 1969 and 1983, the ratio of median earnings of males under age 25 to those
of males over 25 dropped from 74 percent to 55 percent." The percentage of under 25 year
olds in low wage jobs increased from 49 to 64. Lawrence, Sectoral Shifts and the Size of the
Middle Class, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1984, at 3, 5, 9.
51. A full-time worker receiving the minimum wage will earn $6,968. The poverty line
for a nonelderly two person household in 1985 was $6,983. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra
note 37, at 122.
52. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-
ICES, LEAFLET No. 3, MONTHLY BENEFIT STATISTICS: SUMMARY PROGRAM DATA 11
(1986).
53. STAFF OF HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., supra note 28, at 378-79.
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provides benefits which, even when combined with food stamps, get fami-
lies out of poverty.54 In 1985 AFDC and food stamps combined brought
three-person families with no other income up to sixty-six percent of the
poverty line in the median state,55 with the lowest paying state, Missis-
sippi, paying at forty-four percent of the poverty line.5 6 Mississippi's
AFDC payment level, taken alone, is at sixteen percent of the poverty
line.5 7 In Illinois in 1970, AFDC, without food stamps, brought a family
of four with no other income up to ninety-two percent of the poverty
line;5 8 in 1985 Illinois' AFDC payment was at forty percent of the pov-
erty line.
5 9
AFDC has not only eroded very substantially in value, it was also
reduced in scope by the federal budget cuts of the early 1980s. Nearly
half a million families lost their AFDC eligibility at that time. A larger
number had their benefits reduced. 60 Particularly damaging was the de-
struction of the work incentive which had enabled recipients to go to
work and nonetheless retain some of their benefits. Previous to the 1981
budget cuts, the first thirty dollars a month of their earnings and one-
third of the remainder were not counted in calculating the impact of their
earnings on the amount of their benefit. This provision was substantially
eliminated in 1981.
Thus the poor have been caught in a pincer. Work is less available
and the work that exists is worth less. Cash benefits which supplement
earnings from work have been cut, and benefits for those who do not
work have been eroded substantially. In 1979 and 1980 the impact of
inflation was extremely injurious, and in 1981 through 1983 the recession
and the federal budget cuts took over to continue the damage. Through-
out this period the working poor were hurt further by payroll tax in-
creases and by federal income taxes becoming applicable to their
modestly inflated incomes, even though these tax effects do not show up
in the official poverty statistics.
If welfare is not what has caused the increased poverty, there are
certainly observers who will allege that it has caused the all-too-real in-
54. Id. at 371-72.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The Census Bureau's 1985 poverty line for a three person family was $8,570 or
$714 monthly. In 1985, Alabama's monthly maximum for a three person family was $118.
For Mississippi, the monthly maximum was $120.
58. Id
59. Id
60. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN EVALUATION OF THE 1981 AFDC CHANGES:
FINAL REPORT 18, 24 (1985).
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crease in the number of female-headed families and the alarming percent-
age of the births to unmarried mothers. The problem with that
hypothesis is that welfare benefits, as indicated, vary widely across the
nation, but the increases in female-headed households and in the percent-
age of teen births to unmarried mothers are fairly uniform around the
country.61 If young women are having children with the intent or at
least the expectation of continuing to be dependent, one would think they
would do so at least somewhat more frequently in states with higher wel-
fare payments. They do not.
Perhaps then, the problem is that limited as welfare is, it is more
attractive than work, and that causes welfare dependency. Again the
facts are otherwise, notwithstanding the erosion of the minimum wage,
work remains more attractive than welfare mainly because benefits are so
low in most places. Moreover, food stamps remain available to people
who work and are still poor. In no state do welfare and food stamps for a
family of three exceed the returns on a minimum wage job plus food
stamps. And in any of the few places where it is more attractive for a
larger family to be on welfare, that is only because the budget cuts of
1981 wiped out the previous work incentive provision, as explained
above. There is of course a connection between welfare and work. Bene-
fits can be so high as to constitute a disincentive to work. That, generally
speaking, is not the case at the present time.
D. The Incidence of "Persistent" Poverty
Nevertheless, we are becoming aware that "persistent" poverty-a
period of poverty lasting at least eight years-is more prevalent than was
previously supposed. Data gathered by University of Michigan research-
ers indicates that at any one time 55.8 percent of the poor in the cohort
they have studied are persistently poor.62 About half the children in the
cohort who are poor at any given time are persistently poor, even though
they constitute only one-seventh of the children who are poor at some
point during the fifteen years for which data on the cohort are now avail-
able.63 How can this be? Imagine eleven poor children. Ten are poor for
one year each, consecutively, over ten years, and one is poor all ten years.
Only one out of the eleven children who were poor was persistently poor,
61. Ellwood & Summers, Poverty in America: Is Welfare the Answer to the Problem?, in
S. DANZIGER & D. WEINBERG, FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T
78, 94-96 (1986).
62. Bane, Wilson & Young, Poverty and Welfare in America 22 (unpublished paper pre-
pared for New York State Department of Social Services, May 28, 1986).
63. STAFF OF HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., CHILDREN IN
POVERTY 7 (Comm. Print 1985).
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but half the children who were poor in any given year were persistently
poor. And the welfare bill for the persistently poor child will constitute
half the total cost of the welfare paid over the decade. This approxi-
mately depicts the problem we face, except that many poor children do
not even qualify for welfare.
Why so much persistent poverty? Much is due to regional distress.
A disproportionate number of the persistently poor live in rural areas
and the South.64 This supports the conclusion that the major reason for
persistent poverty is chronic unavailability of work for the adults in-
volved; these are the areas of the nation with the greatest lag in economic
development. But other individuals are persistently poor because they do
not have the basic skills to perform in jobs. And some are disorganized,
disturbed, or developmentally disabled people who are going to have a
difficult time functioning in the labor market even if they are given an
opportunity. Living in a female-headed family is a major predictor of
persistent poverty. Being born into a .single-parent family means it is
more likely than not that one will experience persistent poverty during
childhood.
Some-actually a minority-of the persistently poor live in the in-
ner cities with which they are stereotypically associated. For them the
situation is perhaps the most complicated, since there are some economic
opportunities not impossibly distant from them, and yet they do not get
there. The gravity of the problem is illustrated by the employment
figures for blacks sixteen to nineteen years of age, which reflect the situa-
tion of the inner city. One is accustomed to reading that black teenage
unemployment hovers around forty percent, and that is bad enough. But
that implies that six out of ten blacks sixteen to nineteen years of age are
working. In fact, the situation is far worse. Over six out of ten black
teenagers are not even in the labor force or trying to find work. When
the full picture is taken into account, we find that only one in three black
teenagers is working as compared to one out of two white teens (in both
cases a considerable number are in school). About half of those who do
work have part-time jobs, and usually not because they prefer part-time
work. Less than twenty percent of blacks aged sixteen to nineteen years
have a full-time job.65 Among adult black males, only fifty-four percent
are working according to one study, as opposed to seventy-eight percent
64. Id at 45.
65. Bureau of Labor Statistics data cited in YoUTH SERVICE AMERICA, THE YOUTH
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION, August, 1987 (Sept. 4, 1987).
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of adult white males.66 Again, the situation of the inner city is reflected
in these figures.
The persistent poverty of the inner city is associated with racial iso-
lation, poor schools, terrible housing, rampant drug abuse, and high
crime rates, and has produced what might be called, however much one
dislikes the phrase, a "culture of poverty." There is certainly chronic
dependency here, and too much of it. These "ghetto" residents are the
stuff of television documentaries, although the inner city also contains
large numbers of people who work extremely hard, often for very low
wages. These are neighborhoods where most of the middle class moved
out the minute that was possible and left behind a population composed
disproportionately of the least stable and the least able. They suffer from
the concentration effects of their disproportionate poverty, and their con-
sequent disorganization means that the necessary remedies will have to
be complex and sustained.
Thus the poor are not only getting poorer and more plentiful, but
for some of them the reverberative effects of the environment in which
they are trapped make their situation even more complicated.
E. Conclusion: The Diverse Faces of Poverty
The all-too-prevalent public stereotypes of the poor are the black
female unmarried welfare recipient with many children and the black
male "hustler" who lives off the welfare checks of the various women
whose children he has fathered. That a majority of the poor and a major-
ity of welfare recipients are white, and that less than forty percent of the
nonelderly poor receive AFDC or general assistance (state-financed wel-
fare for individuals not eligible for AFDC), are facts which never seem to
come across clearly.67
There are "shiftless" poor of all races, to be sure. But we need a
broader understanding of who is poor and why. A significant number
are beyond working age and are disabled and do not receive enough in
retirement benefits or other assistance to escape poverty. Many are
working and do not earn enough to escape poverty (and have been bur-
dened further by the tax structure). Still others are able-bodied and suffi-
ciently skilled to work but cannot find a job where they live and do not
receive enough government assistance to escape poverty. Too many lack
skills or suffer discrimination or cannot obtain affordable child care, and
66. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, THE FLIP SIDE OF BLACK FAMILIES
HEADED BY WOMEN 9 (Apr. 1984).
67. CENTER FOR BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 20, at 9.
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therefore have no job, and, again, receive insufficient government assist-
ance. Some people lack capability. Some lack interest.
To recapitulate: macroeconomic policy and the economy's health,
poor schooling, racism and discrimination, inadequate child care serv-
ices, severely inadequate public benefits, and failures of individual capac-
ity and responsibility are all causes of poverty.
Problems in the economy and deterioration in the public benefit
structure have made matters significantly worse since 1978. If anyone
thought that the years after World War II finally created a reality of
inexorable progress, the past decade shattered that myth. Things are so
bad for a large number of the poor 68 that we can say their survival is in
question. But if the foregoing lays the basis for an argument for judicial
intervention, it also implies that a full antipoverty strategy necessarily
involves legislative action.
II. The Right to a "Survival" Income: Where
Does It Come From?
Whether there is a "right" to a minimum income and whether it can
be found in the Constitution are two different questions. It may be that
we can establish a claim on the legislature, based on considerations of
moral and political philosophy and economic principles, but that we can-
not connect that claim to the Constitution. Consequently, we need to ask
the two questions.
69
A. The Moral Question
Is there a moral "right"? This is the easy question,70 although it is
certainly not without controversy. One does not have to engage in fancy
philosophy to prove that, in the present generation, many philosophers
who differ with each other on other fundamental matters agree on the
basic point that there is a right to enough income to survive.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
69. There are, of course, other definitions and applications of the word "rights." One
recent commentator on Rawls, for example, points out that "for some universal moral rights
the role of the government is incidental or even nonexistent. These rights are strictly between
persons." R. MARTIN, RAWLS AND RIGHTs 35 (1985). He gives as an example the moral
right not to be lied to.
70. The more controversial questions come when we start grading the importance of the
right for purposes of constitutional analysis. John Hart Ely wryly captured the essence of the
lack of unanimity when he said, "[W]atch most fundamental-rights theorists start edging to-
ward the door when someone mentions jobs, food, or housing: these are important, sure, but
they aren't fundamental" J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 59 (1980).
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Perhaps the most striking expression of fundamental human rights
is found in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
particularly Article 25:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services .... 71
This document represents both an extension of traditional liberalism
beyond laissez-faire into the realm of positive welfare rights, and a reac-
tion to the highly relativistic, utilitarian thinking of the first part of this
century which was incapable even of condemning the evils of Nazism.
72
A strong doctrine of human rights was required-one that could not be
subordinated to utilitarian concepts of maximized individual interests.
The anti-utilitarian nature of human rights is captured by Ronald Dwor-
kin's definition: "If someone has a right to something, then it is wrong
for the government to deny it to him even though it would be in the
general interest to do so.11
7 3
Ratification of a human rights doctrine by a majority of nations,
however, does not in itself prove the existence of those rights.74 Philoso-
phers of fundamental human rights generally derive their position by re-
lying on one of four grounds: intuition, convention, the social contract,
or the positing of conditions necessary for human self-realization.
75
The intuitive approach that all individuals possess self-evident ina-
lienable rights is easily used to justify a right to a survival income, but
only until someone else intuitively asserts the opposite.
Under the conventional morality approach, voluntary customs, ac-
cepted and institutionalized to the point where individuals come to rely
on their existence, eventually develop into socially recognized moral
rights. Thus, legislated or voluntary social welfare benefits could, at
some point, develop into rights. This theory puts the judge in the posi-
tion of wise philosopher who has the duty of sifting through majoritarian
culture to determine its moral principles. 76 Critics charge that society is
71. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in BASIc DOCUMENTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 26 (I. Brownlie ed. 1981).
72. See Pennock, Rights. Natural Rights, and Human Rights-A General View, in
HUMAN RIGHTS 1-5 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1981) [hereinafter Pennock, Rights].
73. R. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 269.
74. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations with no dissenting votes. Pennock, Rights, supra note 72, at 5.
75. E.g., A. GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS 198 (1982); Pennock, Rights, supra note 72, at
10-12.
76. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Nor-
mative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1068-73 (1981) (perceptive discussion
and critique of conventional morality theorists).
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too diverse to share normative moral principles77 and that such a doc-
trine of rights is too value-laden by societal theories of worth, domina-
tion, and prejudice to be valid.7 8  But proponents respond that no
method will allow us to start outside the existing social order; the best we
can do is to make reasoned choices with the knowledge we have.
79
The contract approach to fundamental human rights asks what
would people expect to gain when they give up the unbridled freedom of
the "state of nature"? What level of protection would be the quid pro
quo for their agreeing to forego behavior not punishable in the pre-gov-
ernmental state? Whatever that minimum is, the poorest of the poor in
America have gotten such a raw deal as to constitute the bad end of any
bargain their forebears made. It is hard to argue, short of blaming them
for their own situation, that "they" would have voluntarily entered into a
social contract that would leave them as destitute and desperate as this
one has.80
John Rawls argues that people in the "original position," not know-
ing what is in store for them individually, would choose an equal distri-
bution of basic goods such as food and income.81 Rawls' seminal work
has spawned a veritable cottage industry of critics and commentators,
82
77. Id. at 1068.
78. Harry Wellington, an advocate of the conventional morality approach to fundamen-
tal rights, captured this point: "The major difficulty for the official charged with the task of
determining how the [conventional] moral principles bear in a particular case is in disengaging
himself from contemporary prejudices which are easily confused with moral principles." Wel-
lington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudica-
tion, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 248 (1973).
79. A discussion of the problem of ahistoricism for moral theorists is found in Baker,
Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U.
PA. L. REv. 933, 970 (1983).
80. John Locke wrote that rational men would enter society only if they could anticipate
that it would be to their benefit.
But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty and execu-
tive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands of society... yet it being
only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and
property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an
intention to be worse).
John Locke, Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay, Ch. IX, Sec, 131 in 35 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 54 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952).
81. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19, 141-42 (1971). The "original position" is
Rawls' hypothetical first meeting of citizens of a yet to be formed polity. In this meeting, these
citizens decide what sort of government on which they will agree. Rawls hypothesizes that if
men and women with ordinary talents, ambitions, and ideas are in ignorance of their own
traits, as if behind a veil, and if they act rationally and in their own self-interest, they will
choose to form a government based on Rawls' principles of justice.
82. Among the most prominent scholars with sharply differing views are: B. BARRY,
THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978); R.
NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). For other criticism of Rawls' views, see
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some of whom take the plausible position that people "behind the veil,"
in making the choice which they believe will maximize the general wel-
fare, will not choose an equal distribution of income or even a guaranteed
minimum but an approach without insurance. In this view, the predic-
tion of people while behind the veil is, in effect, that someone else will be
poor.
The contract approach is criticized for its air of unreality. Michael
Sandel, for example, argues that the idea of choice behind the veil has no
meaning because people have no preferences outside of some community
in which they live and function.83 And the idea of an individual exist-
ence antecedent to and separate from the society has deeply troubled a
number of "progressive" thinkers.
8 4
Paul Brest has stated it well:
[I]f consent is a heuristic metaphor that allows theorists to speculate
about what people under certain circumstances might have consented
to, one faces the problem that different philosophers have found hypo-
thetical consent for schemes ranging from Hobbes's monarchy to
Locke's democratic minimal state to Rawls's welfare state .... Con-
sent may get you in the right ballpark, but once there it cannot distin-
guish among blades of grass.
8 5
A final approach defines human rights as those conditions necessary
for human self-realization. Alan Gewirth argues that since all humans
share the same physical need for basic shelter, food, and clothing as a
necessary condition for human action, all humans therefore have a logi-
cal claim and a right to such objects. s6 Thus if A lacks food and the
group has such a surplus of food that their own basic needs are met and
they are able to transfer some food to A, then A has a right to have
food. 87
The roots of this "needs" approach go deep into Western thought.
Aristotle recognized the right of the disabled to a share of the communal
surplus:
[F]or there is a law that anyone with property of less than three minae
who suffers from a physical disability which prevents his undertaking
any employment should come before the [council], and if his claim is
approved he should receive two obols a day subsistence from public
generally N. DANIELS, READING RAWLS (1975); R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS
(1977); R. MARTIN, supra note 69. A bibliography is collected in J. WELLBANK, D. SNOOK &
D. MASON, JOHN RAWLS AND HIS CRITICS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1982).
83. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 59-65 (1982).
84. E.g., Lasch, Individualism, Community, and Public Conversation 4-7 (address deliv-
ered in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Apr. 25, 1985).
85. Brest, supra note 76, at 1101-02 (emphasis in original).
86. A. GEWIRTH, supra note 75, at 198.
87. Id. at 203.
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funds.
88
In times of plenty or when there was bounty from a conquest, the Ro-
mans distributed free food to their poor.89 John Locke approved private
appropriation of property through an investment of one's labor, but only
so long as there be "enough, and as good, left in common for others." 90
Even Nozick recognizes the right to survival embodied in the Lockean
proviso when he condemns cases "where someone appropriates the total
supply of something necessary for life." 91
Whether one believes that fundamental rights can be intuited, de-
rived from conventional norms, the subject of a just contract, or logically
deducible from human needs, there is ample ground to conclude that
human beings have a moral right to a survival income. Unanimity on
what it means to be human is not necessary in order to agree that positive
human rights, such as those embodied in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, are so fundamental as to be just.
We could go further, of course, but it suffices to say that there is a
respectable case for a moral right to some kind of a minimum income.
B. The Constitutional Question: The View From This Side of the Rubicon
We must now address the even harder question. Can we find a right
to minimum income in the Constitution? Those who reject the idea at
the moral level will probably go no further, although it is certainly possi-
ble that one who rejects the idea of a moral requirement might still find it
to be constitutionally required, on positivistic grounds. And many who
accept the notion of a moral obligation do not agree that it is embodied in
the Constitution.
I am hardly writing on a clean slate. For example, Judge Richard
Posner recently wrote that "the Constitution is a charter of negative lib-
erties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal
government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service
as maintaining law and order."
'92
This position is also represented in a recent brief essay by then-
Judge Antonin Scalia. He wrote that "the moral precepts of distributive
justice.., surely fall within the broad middle range of moral values that
may be embodied in law but need not be. It is impossible to say," he
88. Aristotle, The Constitution of Athens, in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOC-
RACY AND OLIGARCHY 190 (J. Moore trans. 1975).
89. M. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY 170-71 (1973).
90. John Locke, supra note 80, ch. V. sec. 26, at 30.
91. R. NozICK, supra note 82, at 179.
92. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
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continued, "that our constitutional traditions mandate the legal imposi-
tion of even so basic a precept of distributive justice as providing food to
the destitute.
'93
Surely fall within the middle range? Impossible to say? Why surely?
Why impossible? That is Scalia's view. Others say differently, and de-
fend their position with elaborate philosophical justifications. It depends
on one's view as to the basic obligations of government and their inclu-
sion in the Constitution. But Scalia is now in a position to have his view
on the subject count more heavily.
So those who insist on narrow devotion to original intent will not be
convinced. But then I think our constitutional history proves them
wrong in any case. 94 The Constitution has acquired new meaning as
times have changed, and properly so.
Frank Michelman has done perhaps the most extensive theoretical
work on the question, explicating Rawls to infer that a constitutional
convention would provide an income guarantee at least on the basis of
"insurance rights" if not offering a straight Rawlsian theory of the distri-
bution of "social primary goods."'95 Michelman also reasons that judicial
review would be appropriately viewed as extending to enforcement of the
right.
96
Michelman seems uncomfortable with the idea that an income guar-
antee inheres in our actual American Constitution viewed as a clean
slate, prior to or absent any initial legislative implementation. He makes
no argument that a poverty-bound class of Americans could approach a
court with a copy of the Constitution and ask for an order that a check
be written. After discussing his hypothetical constitutional convention,
Michelman turns to judicial review on the assumption that the legislature
has already done something which the plaintiffs are challenging as inade-
quate or involving arbitrary classifications, and makes his argument for
93. Scalia, Scalia Speaks, Wash. Post, June 22, 1986, at C2, col. 1 (emphasis in original).
Like Scalia, Epstein stresses that his constitutional view "does not imply.., there is no moral
case for helping those who are in need." But he argues that government has very little power
to help. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 319.
94. The free market libertarians, see supra note 2, are in fact helpful here. They, of
course, reject "the flawed moral arguments of liberal judicial activists," but they also reject
"the jurisprudence of the New Right" for "condemning the resort to morality altogether."
Their position is that everything we know about history draws "conscientious interpreters
toward, and not away from, morality" in understanding the Constitution. Macedo, How
Should Judges Protect Liberty?, in CATO POLICY REPORT 6 (1987).
95. Michelman, One View of Rawls, supra note 3, at 966-67, 1001-03. By "insurance
rights," Michelman means "a right to provision for a certain need-on the order of shelter,
education, medical care-as and when it accrues." Id. at 966.
96. Id. at 991-97, 1003-19.
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judicial action in that context.
97
This is understandable. One Rubicon in American constitutional
law, as Judge Posner's comment illustrates, has been the idea of inferring
affirmative rights to invoke state action. Our constitutional rights are
primarily negative, involving protection against state action rather than
any state obligation to "provide." 98
It is time we crossed that Rubicon, and I think it justifiable doctri-
nally to do so. I say this reluctantly because, as I have indicated and will
discuss in more detail later, the primary public policy impetus regarding
poverty has to be legislative. And I certainly do not advocate going
much beyond the other side of the divide in terms of what I would have
the courts do. But we have come to a legislative impasse on the problem
of poverty that the poor are powerless to break, so if there is a justifiable
constitutional claim it should be vindicated.
In that regard I want to explore two ideas, which I introduced ear-
lier. One idea is that there is a fundamental right to enough income to
survive. This is, for lack of a better term, a substantive due process argu-
ment. If there are certain fundamental rights with which the government
cannot interfere,99 and if these rights are guaranteed under the due pro-
cess clauses, then, if the right to subsist is fundamental and if failure to
assure subsistence constitutes interference with the right, the right to
governmental assistance in order to "survive" can properly be termed
one of substantive due process. 100 The other idea is that government has
been guilty of complicity in the persisting poverty. This is an equal pro-
tection argument. If government policy has created conditions which
have helped some to prosper mightily and left others in a state of total
and absolute deprivation, it has denied the latter the equal protection of
the laws, and steps must be taken to remedy that denial.
97. Id.
98. Cf Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties,
and the Dilemma of Dependency, 99 HARV. L. RPv. 330 (1985) ("[T]he rights protected by the
United States Constitution ... are... usually understood.., to impose on government only a
duty to refrain from certain injurious actions, rather than an affirmative obligation to direct
energy or resources to meet another's needs.").
99. This notion of fundamental rights goes back at least to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (holding that the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause prohibits state laws
forbidding the teaching of foreign languages in grammar schools).
100. The preamble to the Constitution states the framers' undertaking to "establish Jus-
tice, insure domestic Tranquility,... promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty ...." While these phrases have not acquired legal significance in the way that the due
process clauses and others have, they support the idea that the Constitution is not simply a set
of negative guarantees against governmental overreaching but contains affirmative undertak-
ings that are fundamental to the establishment of a community within a constitutional
framework.
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C. Substantive Due Process
(1) The Roosevelt Court: The Unfinished Agenda
What the Roosevelt Court was doing a half century ago with the
"switch in time" is intimately related to the subject of this Essay. The
Court was concerned with aspects of subsistence and survival as we are
here. Millions of workers were being exploited by low wages and unsafe
working conditions. The Court can be said to have been making a bet: if
it stepped out of the way and allowed Congress and the states to legislate
the minimum wage and other protection for workers, the ensuing out-
comes together with the economy's recovery from the Depression would
result in achievement of an acceptable minimum level of economic secur-
ity for all Americans. As we approach the golden anniversary of the
"switch in time," the moment seems especially auspicious to examine
what it has accomplished and what should be done next, particularly
because it, too, occurred about a half century after the adoption of the
laissez-faire doctrine it supplanted.
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish l0l and its progeny involved two dimen-
sions of change, one a reassessment of the balance between the state and
the individual on economic matters and the other a reassessment of the
balance between legislative bodies and the courts on such matters. The
Court was saying, first, that the state would not be violating individuals'
rights if it enacted legislation to protect their economic status in various
ways, and, second, that it would presume the validity of laws falling in
that category. That these twin reassessments were confined to economic
matters was quickly confirmed by subsequent history. Beginning with
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,10 2 the Court
made clear that in matters involving personal liberties and "discrete and
insular minorities" it was signalling neither greater state power over indi-
viduals and groups nor greater judicial restraint in assessing the validity
of laws in those categories.
Mainstream constitutional scholarship has treated West Coast Hotel
as the Court awakening from a half century-long crazed binge and finally
ending its narrow-minded, decades-long sojourn in the pockets of the
captains of industry. Ackerman calls this position the "myth of redis-
covery.' 0 3 Chief Justice John Marshall, to be sure, had articulated a far
greater respect for Congress' handiwork (although not for that of state
legislatures) than the pre-1937 Court had evidenced, so in that sense the
101. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
102. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
103. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1052.
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Roosevelt Court was returning to a position for which there was histori-
cal precedent.
But the circumstances of 1937 were a far cry from those Marshall
was addressing. We really have no idea where he would have stood on
legislation like the Fair Labor Standards Act or the National Labor Re-
lations Act. The bet which the 1937 Court made was brand new. The
idea that legislatures left to their own devices would provide adequate
economic protection for individual citizens if the Court would just stay
out of the way was a new one. The framework of the bet was conserva-
tive in that the Court would assume a passive stance, allowing change to
happen by leaving legislative decisions alone. But the idea was radical: a
new formulation of the separation of powers for the purpose of enhanc-
ing the autonomy and power of individual citizens.
There was no need to frame the issue as one of the fundamental
right of citizens to subsist. The language of permissible economic regula-
tion sufficed. Underlying the framework of regulation, though, was the
issue before us here. Assuring subsistence can be seen as the other side of
the coin of preventing exploitation.
Ackerman, as I said before, refers to this as the legitimation of the
activist welfare state. He is right that the Court legitimized the welfare
state, but he is wrong if he means to imply that in practice the promise of
an activist government in assuring economic security has been fulfilled.
Actual implementation of the authority thereby given has been very
spotty. For the elderly the promise has largely been kept, although not
until the sixties and seventies even for them. For everybody else it has
not. There have been improvements, in the sense of food stamps, Medi-
caid, Head Start, and a few other items, but there are gaping holes left, as
described in detail earlier. So the implementation was limited, although
the idea was certainly far reaching.
Moreover, in overruling Lochner, the Court did not outlaw
"Lochnerizing," to use Tribe's clever construct. 10 4 It certainly stated
that phony notions of freedom of contract were not protected, but it did
not overrule Meyer v. Nebraska 10 5 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 0 6 in
which the Court had recognized other fundamental rights as protected
from state intervention. As one observer has said, the Court's real objec-
tion was that Lochner "generally selected the wrong values for
104. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 435.
105. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state statute prohibiting instruction in a foreign
language in any school prior the ninth grade).
106. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a state statute mandating that students attend
public as opposed to private schools).
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protection." 10
7
In recent years fundamental rights inferred from the values underly-
ing the due process and equal protection clauses have been recognized
with considerable frequency. 108 This is important to my argument for
two reasons. One is the simple point that there are constitutional rights
which arise by giving contemporaneous content to broad words and
phrases in the Constitution, as opposed to the specific, narrow text inter-
preted as a matter of original intent. The broader point is that many of
the fundamental rights that have been recognized relate to family and
personhood, and these are interests which are as deeply jeopardized by
poverty as by any threat or sanction. The cases so far go only to the
water's edge, striking down state interference with the fundamental right
in question, while I want to require the state to go a large step further
and force intervention to protect these rights. But I want to emphasize
that we are already at the water's edge.'0 9
The Court has lost the bet it made in 1937. Legislatures left to their
own devices have not provided adequate economic protection for individ-
ual citizens. If the Court made a new bet now, it would, of course, be
quite different institutionally from the previous one. It would involve
telling legislatures that they must do better than they have done instead
of saying they may intervene, and it would entail action by the Court
rather than approving legislation already enacted. But a broader view of
the underlying reality places such action in a framework that is consis-
tent with what the Court did in 1937; the Court would be addressing one
aspect of the role of the state in framing the boundaries of economic
relationships among private parties.
It was legitimate to stop short in 1937. The Court has ordinarily
stopped short in all contexts for a variety of reasons that we might call
institutional economy. When it has seen that a further remedy was
107. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981,
989 (1979).
108. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (invalidating prohibition on
contraception as violating "a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights"); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (invalidating prohibition on abortion as violating a "right of privacy...
founded in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty"); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (invalidating limitation on dwelling occupancy to nar-
rowly defined families as violating "appropriate limits on substantive due process" which pro-
tect "the sanctity of the family"); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381, 387 (1978)
(invalidating on equal protection grounds a prohibition on marriage by people with child sup-
port obligations without court permission as interfering "directly and substantially with the
right to marry," which is "a fundamental right"); see Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
109. See infra notes 127-174 and accompanying text.
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needed and appropriate, it has provided that remedy. The Court origi-
nally thought that legislatures, unleashed, would do what was necessary.
What was not foreseeable was that even though the Depression would
end and general prosperity would ensue, there would still be significant
poverty-big enough to be very distressing but too small to be an effec-
tive base from which to demand an adequate legislative response.
(2) Legitimizing the Right: Ackerman's Notion of Structural Amendment
We have seen that there is a strong philosophical case for a right to a
minimum income. If the Court were to act toward redress of the imper-
fections in the denouement of the 1937 revolution by decreeing a new
relationship between the individual and the state in the area of economics
and poverty, it would constitutionalize that right, by holding that the due
process clauses encompass a legal obligation on the part of government
to ensure that membership in society is not denuded of meaning by abject
poverty.
It would be considerably harder than it was in 1937 to use Acker-
man's myth of rediscovery in order to place this in a justifiable historical
context. One possible way to explain and legitimize what would be tak-
ing place would be as an example of Ackerman's "structural amend-
ment" of the Constitution: when all three branches join in actions which
alter the previous constitutional understanding, it is appropriate to view
what has occurred as effectively being an amendment to the
Constitution. 110
The "switch in time," in this view, is a situation in which Congress
and the Executive in effect proposed a constitutional change and the
Court "ratified" it. The "switch in time" is not the only example of this.
Brown v. Board of Education 1 1 can be seen as another. While scholars
have argued that Brown represents a correct interpretation of the history
of the fourteenth Amendment,' 1 2 Ackerman takes the position that the
history of that clause is less clear than one would like," 3 making it plau-
sible to argue that history provides no more justification for Brown than
for Plessy v. Ferguson."4 Thus, Ackerman says, perhaps a better way to
justify Brown is as a "structural amendment" on which all three branches
110. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1055-56.
111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. E.g., Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1955).
113. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1063-69; see also G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN
& M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 463 (1986).
114. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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came to agree, albeit in a different institutional order from West Coast
Hotel.
The Brown analogy is important in two respects. First, a critic of
this argument might point out that in West Coast Hotel Congress had
acted first, so that the "structural amendment" of the Constitution there
involved Supreme Court "ratification" of Congress' proposed "amend-
ment," while the proposal I am advocating involves the Court taking the
initiative. Brown, unlike West Coast Hotel, did involve the Court acting
first. It might well be said, in fact, that the "structural amendment" pro-
cess in Brown was not complete until Congress joined by enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. So Brown
was a case, like the one before us, where the Court saw a political and
legislative impasse regarding very basic and important rights, and de-
cided to initiate a process of constitutional change. Moreover, our case is
easier than Brown in the respect, so important to Michelman, 115 that
Congress and the states have been legislating with regard to income
transfer programs for decades, so that the Court, while escalating the
dialogue, would not be initiating it.
The other relevant point raised by Brown concerns the role and obli-
gation of the state. Michael Seidman argues that Brown accentuates the
state's obligation to intervene affirmatively "to prevent the perpetuation
of entrenched hierarchies," adding that Marsh v. Alabama, 1 6 which held
that government "has an affirmative obligation to prevent private corpo-
rations from interfering with freedom of speech," is in the same "alterna-
tive tradition."' 1 7 I shall return to this point shortly.118
(3) Who Decides? Is This An Issue for the Courts?
There is a companion issue here, which I have mentioned in passing.
While there may be a right here, even one which members of Congress
and state legislatures have a constitutional obligation to vindicate, is it
one a court can properly address? This is the question of who decides.
In part this is a question of whether a court has the capacity, or even
the assigned responsibility in our structure, to decide how much is
enough. In Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer raises this issue in "the
case of physical security in a modern American city," and concludes that
"how much less" than "absolute security ... can only be decided politi-
115. Michelson, One View of Rawls, supra note 3, at 1013-15.
116. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
117. Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary
Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1010 n.17 (1987).
118. See infra notes 161-64, 173-74 and accompanying text.
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cally." 119 In another essay, Walzer specifically expresses doubts, on sep-
aration of powers grounds, about Michelman's argument for a judicially
declared right to welfare. 120 "If rights are really at issue," he says, "there
must be a right answer,"121 and a court has no way to know what distri-
bution of income to choose.
This problem is one reason why I propose a "lowest common de-
nominator" judicial remedy, which I will discuss in detail in section III.
While there is precedent for the Court going quite far in fashioning a
remedy once it finds a violation of constitutional rights, 122 Walzer cor-
rectly notes that it makes us uncomfortable to have the Court drawing
lines in realms that seem political.
Nonetheless, I think Walzer oversimplifies. He himself reminds us
of Rousseau's admonition that the people must be "a true people, a com-
munity" in order for us to ensure that they will "will the common
good." 123 And he warns that the people should have the "right to act
wrongly" only if their action "does not preclude future democratic action
within the area." 124 My point is precisely that these features are not
present when it comes to poverty in America. The very wealth that has
been achieved for eighty-five percent of us means that we are, sad to say,
not a "true people" as to the poor and that there is no prospect of "future
democratic action" to eliminate poverty. 125
119. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 67 (1983).
120. Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, in 9 POLITICAL THEORY 379, 391 (1981).
121. Id. at 392.
122. E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279 (1977) ("federal courts can order reme-
dial education programs as part of a school desegregation decree").
123. Walzer, supra note 120, at 384.
124. Id. at 385.
125. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 740-46 (1985)
(constitutional protection of "insular minorities" remains largely ineffective against existing
political realities). J. Kenneth Galbraith makes a similar point. He calls contemporary Amer-
ican poverty, which afflicts a minority, the new poverty, and contrasts it with the old poverty,
which reflected a general situation of misery. J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 245
(3d ed. 1976). Michael Harrington picks up the point, noting that the poverty of the thirties
and earlier represented "the condition of life of an entire society," in contrast to today's poor
who are "the first minority poor in history, the first poor not to be seen, the first poor whom
the politicians could leave alone." M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 8, 10 (rev. ed.
1971). Galbraith, too, discusses the political consequences:
As a result, the modem liberal politician regularly aligns himself not with the
poverty-ridden members of the community but with the far more numerous people
who enjoy the far more affluent income of (say) the modem trade union member or
the intellectual.... Reform now concerns itself with the needs of people who are
relatively well-to-do--whether the comparison be with their own past or with those
who are really at the bottom of the income ladder.
In consequence, a notable feature of efforts to help the very poor is their absence
of any very great political appeal.
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Thus when Ely argues for a "representation-reinforcing orientation"
as the touchstone for determining when to afford judicial review,' 26 our
case would seem directly on point. He might be able to argue, to his own
satisfaction anyway, that other aspects of "fundamental rights" should
be kept out of the courts because of the political prowess of their propo-
nents. But-if there is a constitutional right to a "survival" income-the
poor have no political power to obtain a remedy legislatively, and the
courts should see no barrier on separation-of-powers grounds to their
getting involved. Moreover, Walzer's framing the criterion for judicial
involvement in terms of whether a "right answer" can be found repre-
sents the snare of the well-turned phrase. Where was it written that sin-
gle-celling is what the Constitution mandates in prisons? That a
particular level or degree of training and service is what makes a school
for the mentally retarded pass constitutional muster? There is no "right
answer." Yet the courts have entered the field and issued decrees.
(4) Standing at the Water's Edge: Strands of Support in Existing Doctrine
This, then, is my first constitutional argument: The framework and
structure of our Constitution implicitly create affirmative obligations for
government in a democratic society, among them an obligation to pro-
vide basic food and shelter.
It should be noted again that this is neither an argument based on a
call for significant redistribution nor one based on a demand for income
at a level of adequacy-say, half the median income-which could raise
serious issues about substantial destruction of incentives of those paying
taxes or sufficiency of national resources.127 There is no intention here
of a broad scale attack on wealth; we are only discussing subsistence.
There are strands of doctrine, in addition to the Court's repeated
actions to support family life mentioned earlier, which suggest that the
Court has taken a number of paths to the water's edge in expressing a
solicitude for and even protection of the poor. No decision states an af-
firmative obligation to "provide." Yet a substantial number evince a sig-
J. GALBRAITH, supra, at 249-50. There is an irony here, of course. For, as the nation acquired
the capacity to remedy the misery of the poor by virtue of an affluence that shrank the percent-
age of those who are poor to a relatively small minority, it lost the political will to do so.
When the poor represented a larger percentage of the vote, they had more power. This point
buttresses the observation that there is a legislative impasse regarding further assistance to the
poor which makes judicial intervention more appropriate.
126. J. ELY, supra note 70, at 101-02.
127. Cf Michelson, One View of Rawls, supra note 3, at 966 (noting that although Rawls
can be used to support the idea of a right to a fixed or calculable rate income, it is the right to
shelter, education and medical care-the "insurance right"-that is "susceptible of convincing
recognition and enforcement").
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nificant concern for the poor and mandate extra sensitivity on the state's
part in dealing with them. In the area of education the cases go beyond
the water's edge even if not all the way to the opposite shore.
128
a. Education
The strongest strand of doctrine supporting the idea that govern-
ment has some affirmative obligations to meet basic needs derives from
the Court's handling of education. Here the Court has arguably gone
past the water's edge. Even as it refused to invalidate Texas' system of
school finance in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,129 and even as it found that education is neither an "explicitly" nor
an "implicitly" protected right under the Constitution, 130 it noted that
"some identifiable quantum of education"' 31 might be required. In an
intriguing footnote, the Court indicated that imposition of a tuition
charge for public education would present a "far more compelling" case
than the facts presented. 132
If what Justice Powell had in mind in the footnote was a tuition
charge covering the full cost of education, the economic effect would be
the same as abolishing public education altogether. If there were no pub-
lic education, those with sufficient resources would purchase it in the
private market, and the poor would receive no education. If the state
were to provide "public" education by charging a market price for it, the
poor would be affected in precisely the same way; they would get no
education. If the Supreme Court believes this is unacceptable, it follows
that abolition of public education without making provision for the poor
would be equally unacceptable.
On the other hand, perhaps all Justice Powell had in mind was a
partial tuition involving continuing public subsidy of the remainder of
the cost, but with the tuition set at a level high enough to exclude the
poor. Even so, if education is fundamental enough that a fee charged for
it cannot be set at a level which excludes the poor, it is not at all clear
why it is not fundamental enough for the state to be required to provide
it to the poor regardless of whether tax dollars subsidize it for the rich.
How can anyone participate effectively in America's democratic
processes or the economy without some minimum amount of education?
128. Cf Tribe, supra note 98, at 334 (arguing that the government is not free to leave
distribution of all goods and services to the open market; access to certain things, such as the
franchise and education, must be protected).
129. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
130. Id. at 35.
131. Id. at 36.
132. Id. at 25 n.60.
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Whatever the situation was in 1787, in 1987 education is essential for
everyone.
Notice, by contrast, what the analysis would be with regard to, say,
the municipal opera. Even if the state subsidized the opera and also
charged an admission fee effectively excluding the poor, it is unlikely that
any constitutional problem would be presented. As limited an interest as
education was in the Rodriguez Court's view, it was clearly more funda-
mental than the interest in attending the opera. Indeed, charging a fare
to ride the municipal bus may pose a barrier to some poor people, and
riding the bus is far more essential than going to the opera. Yet bus fares
which burden some poor people would probably not be unconstitutional,
even under my "survival" theory. The tuition footnote tells us that edu-
cation is different, different enough, perhaps, that some modicum of it
must now be provided to those who cannot afford to purchase it. And if
there is a right to some minimum amount of education from the state, at
least for those who cannot afford to buy it, a right to some minimum
amount of income would arguably follow. If education is fundamental to
participation in a democratic society, surely a "bare minimum" income is
at least as fundamental. People who are literally struggling to find
enough to eat are highly unlikely to participate in the political process. 133
Rodriguez is important in two other respects. First, the Court
stressed that the case before it did not represent "an absolute deprivation
of the desired benefit." 134 In Plyler v. Doe 135 it struck down a denial of
public education to certain alien children, concluding that this was a case
which did constitute an impermissible absolute deprivation. While Plyler
and the comment in Rodriguez refer to situations in which education is
being provided to others, the further point is that there is something es-
pecially important about education. 136 The obvious question is, if poor
133. I am well aware that even Justice Thurgood Marshall in his Rodriguez dissent said
that "insufficient food... [and] inadequate housing ... have never been considered to bear the
same direct and immediate relationship to ... our political processes as education has long
been recognized to bear." Id. at 115 n.74 (Marshall, J., dissenting). With all respect, I would
say that Justice Marshall did not focus fully on the real-life consequences of severe poverty.
Perhaps an empirical study of the political participation of the poorest of the poor would help
win Justice Marshall's vote the next time.
134. Id. at 23.
135. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
136. While paying obeisance to its Rodriguez holding that education is not a fundamental
right, the Plyler Court went to some lengths to stress the distinctive nature of education, citing
its "importance ... in maintaining our basic institutions" and its "fundamental role in main-
taining the fabric of our society," commenting that "education provides the basic tools by
which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all," and quot-
ing from earlier cases in which it had placed similar emphasis on the supreme importance of
education. Id. at 221-23.
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or vulnerable children cannot be absolutely deprived of education when
it is provided to others, why can they be absolutely deprived when it is
not?137 What has happened to some of the poor in America can surely be
viewed as absolute deprivation. Why must others be receiving a benefit
in order for those absolutely deprived to claim a right to survival income?
Second, the Court in Rodriguez indicated that one criterion for
whether any group constitutes a "suspect" class is whether it has been
"relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."
138 It
then denied that the poor fit this description. Justice Powell got into the
right church and then seated himself in the wrong pew. 139 Especially in
light of the trend of the past eight years, it seems clear that the poor, or
at least the extremely poor, fit the description precisely.
14°
The foregoing discussion of education is relevant to both our sub-
stantive due process argument and our equal protection argument. I sug-
gested that education is fundamental enough to be required for those
who cannot afford it regardless of whether any education is offered to
those who can pay. When the state subsidizes the rich but charges a
tuition that excludes the poor, the problem is soluble along equal protec-
tion lines. If the state provides no education at all, the claim the poor
can make is based on a substantive due process theory. It would appear,
in fact, that there are three tiers of fact patterns: one tier where the
claims involve interests so unimportant that the state violates no consti-
tutional rights when it subsidizes so as to exclude the poor (the opera
case); a second where the interests are important enough that the state
creates an equal protection problem when it subsidizes so as to deny ac-
cess to the poor yet has no obligation to get into the business (arguably
137. The Court seems to be rethinking the matter, commenting in a 1986 case that "this
court has not yet definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a
fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should
be accorded heightened equal protection review." Papasan v. Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2944
(1986).
138. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
139. Justice Powell's dissent in Papasan indicates he was still seated in the same pew as to
whether the poor can be viewed as a suspect class. The majority's hint, however, discussed in
note 137, supra, indicates some movement on their part in a new direction. Nor did Justice
Powell seem intractable, provided he could find the right theory. He concurred in Plyler on
the basis that penalizing the children solely because of the parents' status properly evoked
heightened scrutiny, and went on to say that if the same denial had occurred with regard to
welfare, it would also have been "an impermissible penalizing of children because of their
parents' status." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
140. Cf Ackerman, supra note 125, at 742 (Ackerman describes the victims of poverty as
"both diffuse and anonymous," and unlikely to command their deserved attention from the
majority.).
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the municipal bus case); and a third where the state can neither subsidize
in a way that excludes the poor nor drop out altogether, thus implicating
both equal protection and substantive due process theories (the education
case according to my reading of Rodriguez and Plyler).
b. Griffin and the Benefits Cases
There is a series of cases, beginning with Griffin v. Illinois,'4' on the
threshold of the third tier just outlined if not within it. They all involve
services which, if supplied by the State, may not be provided in a discrim-
inatory manner against the poor or among groups of the poor; in other
words, the second tier pattern. But all these cases contain implications
that the state may have a duty that goes beyond nondiscriminatory
treatment.
The interesting point in Griffin is Justice Harlan's dissent from the
holding that the state must provide indigent defendants a trial transcript
for purposes of appeal. One might have thought that, with a person's
liberty at stake, the required provision of a transcript to an indigent ac-
cused would be easy to discern, at least when other appellants are al-
lowed to purchase transcripts. Justice Harlan did not think the case was
obvious at all. He accused the Court of creating an affirmative duty on
the state's part:
All that Illinois has done is to fail to alleviate the consequences of
differences in economic circumstances that exist wholly apart from any
state action .... [The] issue here is not the typical equal protection
question of the reasonableness of a "classification" on the basis of
which the State has imposed legal disabilities, but rather the reasona-
bleness of the State's failure to remove natural disabilities. 142
Justice Harlan's logic applies to the subsistence income issue here. We
are arguing for a state obligation to provide a subsistence income given
what is, to use Justice Harlan's terminology, the unreasonableness "of
the State's failure to remove natural disabilities." If the state's obligation
to remove the consequences of indigency can be said to arise indepen-
dently of the threat by the state to take away the defendant's liberty,
Griffin is surely relevant to our case for a right to subsistence income.
The benefits cases came later. The first was Goldberg v. Kelly,' 43 in
which the Court held that AFDC benefits could not be terminated with-
out a prior hearing, and referred to AFDC as "the means to obtain essen-
tial food, clothing, housing and medical care . . . the very means by
141. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
142. Id. at 34-36.
143. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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which to live." 144 It said welfare was "not mere charity," but rather a
way "to help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities
that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community."
145
The Goldberg Court did not precisely declare why the state, which
had created the limited property interest in Goldberg, was not therefore
free to do as it wanted in tailoring the procedures accompanying the ben-
efit. The Court's rhetoric about the essentiality of AFDC suggests that
the state, in conferring the benefit, was conferring something important
enough that it could not add a condition allowing revocation without a
full hearing. 146 Laurence Tribe goes further, calling the Goldberg hold-
ing "a rule explicable only in terms of an underlying right to subsistence
at least when a welfare program has been established."' 147 In no case
since Goldberg has administrative withdrawal of a benefit been held to
entail such elaborate procedural protection. To some extent this is be-
cause the Court has moved away from Goldberg, but this is also because,
with one strongly arguable exception, 148 no case has involved the essen-
tials of life itself.
Another recognition of the fundamental importance of welfare oc-
curred the same year as Goldberg in Shapiro v. Thompson, 149 in which the
Supreme Court, in striking down a one-year residency requirement for
welfare, again referred to welfare as "aid upon which may depend the
ability of families to obtain the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and
other necessities of life."' 150 Four years later, in Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 51 the Court struck down a durational residency re-
quirement for free indigent medical care, referring to such care as "as
much 'a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as welfare assistance."' 152
144. Id. at 264.
145. Id. at 265.
146. Compare Goldberg with Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of unem-
ployment benefits to worker who quit job in weapons production plant because of religious
convictions is an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of his religion); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (refusal of unemployment benefits to worker who will not work on
Saturdays for religious reasons is an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her reli-
gion). See generally Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984).
147. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW supra note 3, at 1117.
148. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (involving Social Security disability
payments).
149. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
150. Id. at 627.
151. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
152. Id. at 259. Cf Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 89-90 (1972) ("a stove or a bed may be
... essential to provide a minimally decent environment for human beings in their day-to-day
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The Court treated these two cases as involving right-to-travel issues, but
the right to travel was triggered only because of the fundamental nature
of the interest in subsistence that had been interfered with by the dura-
tional residency requirements.1
53
Still a third indication of the Court's concern comes from cases in
which Congress or a state has totally denied a "survival" benefit to a
subgroup of poor people on a basis that the Court decided had no justifi-
cation. One such case is United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno,154 in which Congress had denied food stamps to households
containing unrelated individuals. Another is New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization v. Cahill,155 in which the state had denied AFDC benefits to
households containing illegitimate children. The Court has been far less
solicitous in situations where the deprivation was not total, rejecting
challenges to a Maryland law that capped benefits regardless of family
size after the fourth child 156 and a Texas law which afforded elderly and
disabled welfare recipients more help than children. 157 Even a total dep-
rivation of an unimportant benefit would be unlikely to evoke the Court's
wrath. It is, again, the fundamental nature of the "survival" interest that
has made the Court willing to strike down arbitrary total deprivations of
basic benefits.
All of these cases involve limitations on what a state can do when it
confers a benefit, as opposed to obliging it to initially confer the benefit.
But there was a time when the argument for any limitation at all would
have been dismissed out of hand on the ground that the state did not
have to confer the benefit and that "the greater includes the lesser."'' 5
8
The precise circumstances under which a particular condition attached
to a benefit will be struck down are beyond the scope of this Essay, but it
is now clear that certain benefits are more fundamental than others.
lives"); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969) ("prejudgment garnish-
ment ... may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall").
153. Compare the result in Shapiro and Memorial Hospital with that in Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 396 (1975), where the Court upheld a one-year durational residency requirement for
access to state's divorce courts.
154. 413 U.S. 528 (1973); see also United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S.
508, 514 (1973) (striking down federal statute denying food stamps to college dormitory
"households" with members over 18 years old who had been claimed as dependents on their
parents' tax returns for the previous year); Wohlgemuth v. Williams, 416 U.S. 901 (1974),
aff'g 366 F. Supp. 541, 546-49 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (summary affirmance of decision striking down
state denial of general assistance to unemancipated minor living with unrelated person who
was not receiving assistance).
155. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
156. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970).
157. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972).
158. Kreimer, supra note 146, at 1304-14.
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Conditions on such benefits will be invalidated more readily. 159
Once we accept the proposition that certain benefits are so basic as
to bring into serious question a considerable list of conditions that might
be appended to them, the leap to inferring a state obligation to provide
help in the first place becomes less prodigious.
This precise point worried Robert Bork a great deal. Commenting
on the benefits cases of the early seventies, he noted that their adherents
apparently [conclude] that a claimant cannot go into a court and de-
mand a welfare program as a constitutional right, but if a welfare pro-
gram already exists, he can demand that it be broadened. The right to
broadening rests upon the premise that there is a basic right to the
program. If so, why cannot the Court order a program to start up
from scratch?
160
Like Justice Harlan in Griffin v. Illinois, Judge Bork correctly saw the
analytical implications of the benefits cases.
The distinction between acts and omissions is a hazy one in any
case. Sometimes a failure to act occurs under circumstances in which the
omission results in liability. Recently, for example, the Court, in decid-
ing that a prisoner's warning to officials about his fear of being attacked
by another prisoner did not create liability when they took no steps to
protect him, conceded that a case "where officials simply stood by and
permitted the attack to proceed" would be "quite different."' 161 The
analogy is from tort law, but the point can be made with rhetorical, if not
legal, force that, at least as to the poorest of the poor, the United States
today is in the position of the jailer who stands by and lets the attack
proceed.
The haziness of the act-omission distinction is evident when we look
at speech. There is no legally significant difference between the act of
refusing to grant a permit for a rally in a public park and the omission of
failing to provide police protection for the rally when it occurs. 162 Free
159. In 1986 the Court decided a case in which recipients of AFDC and food stamps
claimed that obtaining a social security number for their two-year-old daughter as a condition
of her getting those benefits violated the family's Native American religious beliefs. While the
Court, for reasons unnecessary to explain here, vacated an injunction the recipients had ob-
tained below, a majority stated that the government has an affirmative obligation to provide a
religious exemption to the facially neutral requirement that applicants and recipients provide
the state with a social security number. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986). "The rise of
the welfare state," Justice O'Connor wrote, "was not the fall of the Free Exercise Clause." Id.
at 2169.
160. Bork, supra note 3, at 699.
161. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
162. E.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1969) (demonstrators peacefully ex-
ercising their first amendment rights are denied due process when they, and not hecklers, are
arrested after hecklers threaten to cause "impending civil disorder" during rally).
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speech, of course, is explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, and there-
fore entails an affirmative obligation on the part of the state to protect it,
while the right to a "survival" income is not. But, as we have already
seen, there are some fundamental interests with which state action can-
not interfere that are nowhere explicitly written in the Constitution. 163
Logically, the unworkability of the act-omission distinction would apply
to them, too. If a state's omission can interfere unacceptably with
speech, why is it not the case, for example, that a state's omission might
be the basis for concluding there has been an impermissible interference
with privacy? If the state cannot condition marriage on the prospective
groom satisfying certain preexisting statutory support obligations,
164
why, as we said earlier, should the state be able to interfere with marriage
by failing to provide a level of survival assistance sufficient to keep inabil-
ity to survive from being what stands in the way of a wedding?
It must be conceded that Harris v. McRae 165 looms rather directly
across the path toward finding support in existing law for a state obliga-
tion to help the poorest of the poor. One would have thought medically
necessary abortions for indigent women raised an issue of need at a fairly
elemental level, especially in light of the existence of the Medicaid pro-
gram. But the Supreme Court said the state has no obligation in this
connection. In Maher v. Roe, 166 while the issue-nontherapeutic abor-
tions-was relatively less compelling, the Court made a point of adding,
gratuitously from an analytical point of view, that "[t]he Constitution
imposes no obligation on the States to pay ... any of the medical ex-
penses of indigents."
167
How should we deal with Harris v. McRae? We have already ac-
knowledged that the current Court will not declare the right to a "sur-
vival" income advocated here and that the support in the cases is not for
a right to a "survival" income per se, but rather is in the form of bits and
pieces of special protection for the poor, and even that is hardly explicit
163. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
164. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a Wisconsin stat-
ute that precluded the issuance of a marriage license to any resident with a minor child not in
his custody unless the resident could show that child support obligations had been met); see
also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (" 'This Court has long recog-
nized that freedom of choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" (quoting Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974))); cf Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
375-77, 382-83 (1971) (due process requires that indigents be allowed access to divorce courts
regardless of their inability to pay costs).
165. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
166. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).




We might, therefore, suggest that Harris is simply wrong, as four
Justices thought in dissent. 169 Moreover, Harris represents only one of
the possible positions which the Court might take, based on history and
theory and the judicial philosophy of the justices sitting at the time. The
Harris majority in fact acknowledged that a "penalty" on protected ac-
tivity would be unacceptable, but said "a refusal to fund protected activ-
ity, without more, cannot be equated with" a penalty.170 But we have
already seen that the line between act and omission is hazy, and the
Court has itself acknowledged that the line between penalties and bene-
fits is not supportable once a benefit is extended.171 Moreover, the issue
in Harris can be framed in terms of a condition on a benefit-that medi-
cal assistance is available to indigent pregnant women provided they do
not use it to obtain an abortion. The condition is that one not seek an
abortion; the penalty is that assistance is lost when one engages in that
particular protected activity.1 72
Pursuing our argument that Harris is wrong, we can return to the
speech analogy of a moment ago. If the state acts unconstitutionally
when it fails to protect a speaker from private interference with his
speech, what is the difference when it fails to protect a pregnant woman
from interference by a physician with her right to an abortion because of
her inability to pay? As Michael Seidman and Mark Tushnet and their
colleagues have put it:
If one begins with the premise that it is important for women to have
the abortion option, is there a sensible theory under which it is possible
to distinguish between interference with that option by state action and
interference by private action which the state fails to prevent?17
3
To demonstrate that there is an obligation to provide a "survival"
income, we would have to take one further step to make our "dissent" in
Harris work for us. We must argue that "survival" is as fundamental as
168. See, eg., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549-51 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). But cf Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 753 (1975) (holding that
the Social Security Act's denial of benefits based on a duration-of-relationship requirement is
not unconstitutional); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507-16 (1976) (denying survivor bene-
fits to illegitimate children based upon their inability to prove dependency as statutorily de-
fined is not unconstitutional).
169. Cf Tribe, supra note 98, at 336-37 (remarking that the Harris decision is especially
weak in light of the government's decision to pay for childbirth for poor women).
170. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
171. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986), is the latest in a line of cases to make this
point.
172. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 329, 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 337, 338 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
173. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 113, at 685.
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privacy. If the state cannot jeopardize survival without procedural due
process, and if the state cannot totally deprive one group of recipients of
survival help when it extends that help to others similarly situated, then
the Court has already recognized that survival is important. Our Harris
"dissent" would provide precedent by analogy for the proposition that
the state also has an obligation to prevent the private action of the mar-
ket from jeopardizing survival.
Harris can be viewed as wrong in light of Plyler v. Doe, as well.
What the Court denies in Harris is a right to a few hundred dollars in
funding for alleviation of an acute condition which is sometimes volunta-
rily acquired. What the Court goes a considerable distance toward rec-
ognizing in Plyler is a right to a minimum education that costs much
more, for the purpose of alleviating a chronic condition of ignorance that
is involuntarily acquired. It can surely be argued that the greater in-
cludes the lesser, and that Plyler serves to highlight the dubiousness of
Harris.
We could also remove Harris from the path of our argument by
distinguishing it. The whole point of Roe v. Wade, we would say, was to
make abortion a matter to be left totally outside government and in the
private sphere. Harris and Maher are cases in which the Court went to
extraordinary lengths to assure that the government would be totally re-
moved from the decision whether to have an abortion. If it is appropri-
ate to view Roe v. Wade as involving an underlying right to maintenance
of a private sphere, it is not so surprising that there is no right to govern-
mental intervention. The right of survival asserted here is exactly the
opposite: it is an argument for a right to governmental intervention and
extension of the public sphere to minimum income. The appropriate
analogy is not public funding for abortion but the right, for example, to a
public forum in free speech cases. The abortion cases, an effort by the
Court to assure an area of liberty completely free from government, are
distinguishable.
Thus, case law takes our proposition to the water's edge and perhaps
a bit further. The sensitivity in Rodriguez and Plyler to the interests of
the poor in the analogous area of education, the strong language in
Goldberg accompanying the decision requiring extensive procedural pro-
tection, the similar language in Shapiro and Maricopa County striking
down unacceptable conditions on benefits, and the willingness in Moreno
and New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization to reject denials of benefits
to similarly situated beneficiaries, all suggest the Court's recognition, at
least on occasion, of the importance of subsistence. Perhaps it is not out
of place to recall that creatures which look like ducks, quack like ducks,
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and flap like ducks turn out to be ducks. The Court has not faced up to
the implications of its own reasoning. 174
D. Equal Protection
Regardless of any argument that the state has an affirmative obliga-
tion to "provide," there is a second major constitutional approach. We
can infer an equal protection obligation to assist the poor if the state has
"done" something to cause the undue poverty and thereby has treated
the poor differently from everyone else (saving for later the issue of
whether it has to have done so with discernible discriminatory intent).
With such evidence we can infer the state's obligation to assure "sur-
vival" not by writing on the clean slate of basic constitutional structure
but by drawing it from the state's complicity in placing people in such
severe economic jeopardy.
What has the state "done"? The answer is a lot. To argue that the
poor are in that condition purely because of the operation of a free mar-
ket is to ignore volumes of history. Indeed, the government chose a so-
called free market as well as the incidents and attributes of that structure.
Government policy has been shaping the market and the ability of people
to participate in it for a long time.
I need to make one thing clear before I proceed. I am not arguing
that government's conscious efforts to aid the poor have made them
worse off. The poor would definitely be worse off without the programs
that exist today.175 The government's specific efforts to alleviate poverty
have not been counterproductive, only gravely insufficient. Rather, the
entire economic structure of American society and a series of specific
governmental policy decisions over time have contributed to the exist-
ence, scope, depth, and perpetuation of poverty.
The idea that the legal arrangements which government makes to
create the rules of the game for the private economy are themselves state
action is neither a new nor a simple idea. Paul Brest twitted the posi-
174. Commentators have stopped at the water's edge with the same uncomfortable result.
A recent student note defines "subsistence" as the "bare means of survival," states that "depri-
vation of subsistence for too long results in death," criticizes the courts for not applying at
least a heightened form of scrutiny to benefits laws or regulations that deprive a subgroup of
eligibility, and then states, "It is not asserted here that a citizen has an affirmative constitu-
tional right to welfare, nor that the denial of subsistence by itself should trigger heightened
scrutiny. A state could deny welfare to all its citizens without raising equal protection con-
cerns." Note, Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare Laws That Deny Subsistence,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1547, 1560-61 (1984) (emphasis in original). My suggestion is that the
author gave up too easily.
175. Danziger, Haveman & Plotnick, Antipoverty Policy: Effects on the Poor and the
Nonpoor, in S. DANZIGER & D. WEINBERG, supra note 61, at 50, 54.
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tivists for implying that all property interests are creatures of the state,
pointing out that "since any private action acquiesced in by the state can
be seen to derive its power from the state, which is free to withdraw its
authorization at will, positivism potentially implicates the state in every
'private' action not prohibited by law." 176 Justice Rehnquist, aware of
the trap, made sure in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks 177 to say, after describing
property rights in positivist fashion:
It would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our previous
cases, the notion of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment to
hold that the mere existence of a body of property law in a State,
whether decisional or statutory, itself amounted to "state action" even
though no state process or state officials were ever involved in enforc-
ing that body of law.
178
Beyond Brest's telling comment that "positivists ... cannot so read-
ily have it both ways,"' 179 there is obvious sense in the idea that the "in-
visible hand of economics,"' 180 as Tribe calls it, is not invisible at all.
Discussing the demise of Lochner, Tribe observes that the preexisting
working conditions addressed by the minimum wage laws were
a product of conscious governmental decisions to take some steps af-
fecting the affairs of economic life-punishing some people as thieves,
awarding damages to others as the victims of trespass or breach of
contract, immunizing still others through concepts of corporate law-
while not taking other steps that might rescue people from conditions
of intolerable deprivation.181
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has in fact intervened to
strike down laws which allowed people to make economic bargains with
one another that represent unacceptable outcomes from a social point of
view. In The Peonage Cases, 182 a very conservative Supreme Court de-
cided early in this century that two Alabama statutes permitting coerced
176. Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Case Note on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1301 (1982).
177. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
178. Id. at 160 n.10.
179. Brest, supra note 176, at 1302; see also L.TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra
note 6, at 253 (commenting that "if particular state rules ... themselves ... [are] properly
challenged, a different kind of state action would ... [be] at issue," and characterizing Flagg
Brothers as a case in which "the Court continued to elaborate on the conventional if largely
empyt catagories of state action.").
180. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 446.
181. Id. at 447-48 (emphasis in original).
182. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (striking down a statute making it a crime to
leave a job without repaying an advance); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914)
(upholding a federal conviction for peonage of employers who, as permitted by state law, em-
ployed convicted people on a coerced basis in lieu of imprisonment and fines); see Schmidt,
The Peonage Cases: The Supreme Court and the "Wheel of Servitude, " in 9 HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 820 (1984).
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labor under certain circumstances constituted peonage and therefore vio-
lated the thirteenth amendment. It is more than a rhetorical flourish to
say that if such a conservative Court was willing to take the minimalist
step of saying certain market outcomes enforceable under state law were
too extreme to be permitted, even our current conservative Supreme
Court should take the equally minimalist step of holding that an income
that does not even permit subsistence is an outcome of state-sanctioned
economic arrangements that will not be tolerated.
Our entire system of legal rules shapes wealth and poverty in the
United States. The same kinds of governmental decisions that caused
people to need the protection of the minimum wage and other labor stan-
dards, and in the extreme form evoked The Peonage Cases, are shaping
poverty today. The laws of property and contract, the laws which create
corporations and set the terms under which they operate, and the crimi-
nal laws preventing theft, among others, are really at issue here.
Moreover, a whole series of specific governmental policies have con-
tributed to the intensification of poverty. Governmental decisions that
have shaped the location of jobs and the location of people in relation to
those jobs are a good example. This argument does not go to the overall
number of jobs but rather to the disparity between available jobs and
available people. Government policy drew people to the cities to work in
the war plants in two world wars, then took few steps to facilitate their
adjustment later, when the war jobs were gone. Large numbers of poor
people were left in inner cities, distant from jobs, and without sufficient
resources to relocate. Government policy since World War II has helped
to destroy small, family farms in favor of larger, mechanized, agribusi-
ness, forcing some people into the cities and leaving others in rural areas
with no livelihood. At least insofar as those who were drawn into the
cities by the war or the destruction of small farms were black, govern-
ment policy helped assure that they had very limited choices concerning
where to live, usually far from available work. Government policy in-
creased that distance by paying vast sums for highways which decentral-
ized work even further while policies of racial and, for that matter,
economic segregation kept the poor of all races pinned in the central
cities. Thus, many are poor in part because of where they live, and this is
in significant part not the result of private market forces.
Second, government has shaped the ability of people to participate
in the labor market by the schooling it has provided. Many of the poor
cannot find jobs because they are so badly undereducated and underskil-
led. America's public schools, especially those in the inner cities, are
inescapably part of this problem. Those whose poverty is perpetuated by
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inadequate education-and there are many for whom this is a very signif-
icant factor-have unquestionably been injured by government policy.
Third, government shapes the total number and quality of jobs
available in the economy and the take-home pay of those who have work.
Fiscal, monetary, and trade policies all affect the total number of jobs
and the tax bites on those who do work. When the Federal Reserve de-
cides on a policy of high-interest rates to fight inflation, and there is no
concomitant Congressional response to aid the people who lose their jobs
as a consequence, the new recruits to the ranks of the poor are there
because of government policy. Government's stance on occupational
health and safety and on disability and workman's compensation is also
important. If accidents or disease stemming from the work place make a
person poor when better regulation would have prevented the outcome
and better compensation would ameliorate it, government has played a
role in intensifying poverty. The government's direct job-creation poli-
cies are also relevant here. For example, the location of defense contrac-
tors affects the ability of the poor to find work. Thus the day is long past
when the number of jobs and their effective pay were solely determined
by market forces (although even a governmental stance of total laissez-
faire is also a government policy that affects the incidence of poverty).
All right, it will be admitted for purposes of argument, there has
been state action that has helped to make certain people poor and keep
them that way. But where is the proof of discriminatory intent or pur-
pose? Do not Washington v. Davis 183 and Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp. 184 tell us that disparate outcomes
stemming from the application of facially neutral statutes are not
enough? Moreover, has the Court not told us pretty explicitly that pov-
erty is not a suspect classification and subsistence is not a fundamental
interest?1 85
There is case law that we could point to as a basis for distinguishing
these cases. For example, sometimes we simply "know" that a facially
neutral race-specific statute is racially motivated in a negative way,1 86
and sometimes a facially neutral state action will be invalidated because
183. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
184. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
185. E.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) ("[T]his Court has never held that
financial need alone identifies a suspect class for the purpose of equal protection analysis.").
186. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet
ask the following question about Loving: "Is the point that in a culture dominated by whites,
blacks are harmed more than whites by laws separating the races or suggesting that race is a
relevant factor in decisionmaking?" G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET,
supra note 113, at 575. It can be argued that Brown v. Board of Education is such a case.
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the negative racial context is so clear. 187 Another way to view these cases
is that sometimes the outcome of a particular statute or state action is so
unacceptable that we dispense with proof of intent. That, we would say,
is our case.
Thus, if it were established that Davis and Arlington Heights apply
only when the disparate racial impact of a facially neutral statute is so
minimal or incidental as to carry no indication of legislative purpose,
that would make them of less concern. The fact is, however, that they
are pernicious and dangerous, as shown by the Court's 1987 decision that
mere statistical evidence of racial disparity in the application of capital
punishment is constitutionally irrelevant, 8 a decision that is a direct
"descendant" of Davis and Arlington Heights.
How sweeping are the implications of these cases? One has to spec-
ulate that a Court which thinks like the Davis and Arlington Heights
Courts would not have decided The Peonage Cases as they were decided.
While the issue there was obviously not one of a classification for equal
protection purposes, the statutes were arguably not facially defective.
One could imagine, for example, a modern community sentencing pro-
gram, benignly administered, that looks on its face like the Alabama
practice condemned in United States v. Reynolds. The defendant is sen-
tenced to work for a private employer instead of being sent to prison. If
he violates the conditions of that employment he goes to jail. What in-
fected the Alabama practice is that everyone knew it was not a progres-
sive, benign policy but exactly the opposite. Would a Washington v.
Davis approach require proof of malevolent legislative purpose
nonetheless?
Davis and Arlington Heights seem inconsistent with Griffin v. Illinois
and some of the ensuing poverty cases, too. If allowing the purchase of
trial transcripts to build a record for the purpose of criminal appeal does
not create a wealth classification on the face of the statute, one could well
argue, as Justice Harlan in effect did in his dissent, that the disparate
effect on poor defendants is of no constitutional consequence in the ab-
sence of proof of bad legislative intent.
Thus we need to argue either that Davis and Arlington Heights are
wrong and should be overruled in whole or in part or that they can be
distinguished. Either way, our argument would be that when a large
array of governmental actions, taken as a whole, has had a foreseeable
187. E.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (striking
down as unconstitutional a Washington State initiative which attempted to terminate
mandatory desegregation busing).
188. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3199 (1987).
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impact as severe as the extreme poverty that it has had a definite role in
causing, the constitutional rights of the "extremely" poor should be re-
garded as having been violated, regardless of the level of scrutiny we use
to examine the state action involved. This is, in an important sense, a
narrow argument, one without immediate, broad implications for other
cases. The challenge would not go to the poverty producing impact of a
particular state road building or zoning decision but rather to the impact
of decades of governmental action. Nor would the effort be to say that
all "poverty" as it is officially defined is illegal but rather to focus on
extreme poverty that does not even allow subsistence.
We would be recognizing that facially neutral state action has
played a significant part in creating what now threatens to become a per-
manent underclass in society. The state has helped put people in a posi-
tion of being unable to find work and unable to perform available work.
There should not have to be proof that the state intended this result.
Disparate outcomes are ordinarily not enough to invalidate state action
but, if we are not going to overrule Davis and Arlington Heights, this
should be one of those circumstances where we do not require proof of
intent or purpose. The outcome-millions with inadequate or even no
shelter and not enough to eat and no prospect of escaping their fate-is
unconscionable in a society as wealthy as ours has become. The state has
interacted with the private economy to create a system that leaves people
in a subservient caste. It must now intervene.
III. The Remedy: Do We Want the Courts Involved, or Not?
Suppose there is some kind of a right here. What is the remedy?
How will the suit be framed? It is unlikely that a class of poor people
will at any foreseeable time come to the courthouse and ask that Con-
gress or a state legislature be told to pass a law providing them a guaran-
teed income. It will make more sense for the plaintiffs to challenge a
particular statutory scheme, rather than to say nakedly that they are
challenging the government's failure to act.
A. Attacking AFDC
There are a number of possibilities. My discussion only involves
attacks on AFDC, and this of course assumes that the AFDC structure
will continue to resemble what it does today.
There are at least two considerations in deciding upon the scope of
an AFDC-based action to achieve a subsistence or "survival" income.
One is whether the attack should focus on AFDC nationwide, or state by
state. The former is certainly possible, since AFDC is a federal statute.
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The latter is more focused and, in a low-paying state like Mississippi,
would be more unambiguous in character. The second consideration is
whether the attack should be confined to seeking a remedy as to payment
levels to existing recipients, or whether it should address as well the arbi-
trary exclusion of similarly situated people from AFDC coverage.
Given the line running through the benefits cases, discussed earlier,
that total deprivation is the touchstone most attractive to the courts, the
total exclusion of some of the most seriously needy from eligibility is a
logical starting point. Two-parent families are currently eligible in only
about half the states. Childless families and single individuals are not
eligible for AFDC at all. Even in states which provide AFDC to two-
parent families, one parent must have worked recently for a fairly
lengthy period of time in order to qualify. Because the purpose of the
two-parent program is to supplement inadequate unemployment com-
pensation and then replace unemployment benefits when they run out,
young families with little or no work experience lose out. All of these
gaps in benefits could be challenged under a total-deprivation theory.
The challenge to payment levels, whether or not accompanied by a
challenge to the total exclusion of some people, would be based on the
theories set forth earlier. Hence, the payment level in, say, Mississippi is
so low (less than half the poverty line with food stamps included) as to be
below subsistence, which constitutes such a totality of deprivation as to
trigger both a substantive due process and an equal protection right to a
higher benefit.
Both the gaps in eligibility and the inadequacy of benefits can be
challenged in either a national attack on AFDC or an attack on the pro-
gram in a single, low-paying state. A national action would argue that
the entire AFDC structure is unconstitutional because it permits gross
disparities among the states in benefit levels, including payment levels
below a reasonable definition of subsistence, and because it contains arbi-
trary boundaries on eligibility categories that have nothing to do with
need. There is certainly factual merit to the allegations, and all of the
legal theories laid out above would apply. The objections are therefore
tactical. The remedy sought would be broad in two respects: first, it
would seek a nationally applicable minimum income guarantee at some
"survival" level; and second, it would seek to apply that minimum to
everyone who is in jeopardy and not just to those currently eligible. The
remedy would involve annual expenditures of billions of dollars,
although probably less than the current administration seeks in annual
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increases to the defense budget but costly nonetheless. 189 The suit pre-
sumably would be directed at Congress, and would cut against the cur-
rent financing structure of AFDC which involves varying degrees of state
matching. And it would be highly visible and perhaps vulnerable as a
political matter (although it is certainly possible that by the time such a
case reaches the Supreme Court all of these barriers may seem less formi-
dable than they do now even if the structure of AFDC itself has not
changed substantially).
What therefore may make more sense is to mount an attack on one
state's low AFDC payment level and seek "survival" relief against that
one state, with consequent implications for suits against other states.
This would be more manageable politically and fiscally. It could more
feasibly include as plaintiffs persons not now eligible for AFDC, because
the decree would have less far reaching fiscal and political implications if
accomplished originally in relation to the program of one state.
B. What Is A "Survival" Income?
If the most practical framework for suit is to challenge one low-
paying state's AFDC program, what level of income guarantee should
the plaintiff seek? In other words, what is a "survival" income?
The existing benefits cases show that the Court has responded favor-
ably to petitioners who had been totally deprived of assistance, albeit in
circumstances where others had been helped. 190 The Court has not been
sympathetic to people whose complaint was that they were receiving less
than others.1 91 The Rodriguez Court mentioned that it would be sympa-
thetic to an "absolute deprivation" of education, 92 and it was, in Plyler
v. Doe.193 The remedy in these cases gave the plaintiffs what existing
recipients were receiving. Here, however, there are no similarly situated
recipients in the particular state who are receiving the assistance the
plaintiffs are demanding. By analogy, if the allegation that is received
most favorably is total deprivation, the remedy, it would seem to follow,
is alleviation of that deprivation, or a minimum "survival" income.
189. Current estimates are that it would cost $46.6 billion annually to bring all of the poor
up to the poverty line by way of straight cash grants. STAFF OF HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS
COMM., supra note 28, at 568. In constant dollars the poverty "gap" rose from $28.4 billion in
1975 to $46.6 billion in 1984. Id. This estimate does not take into account any expenditures
necessary to prevent work disincentives for jobs paying about the same amount as the level of
income guaranteed.
190. See supra cases cited in notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
191. See supra cases cited in notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
193. 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39
DUTY TO THE POOR
So the idea of a "survival" income as a rather bare minimum-
which is in contrast to "absolute deprivation"-has support in the cases.
Can we eke out a more generous view on other premises? It would be
nice to assure everyone an income at the poverty line. That, as we have
seen, is not a generous amount. The problem is that moving to an income
guarantee at the poverty line, at least given current wage structures,
would create work disincentives in larger families, unless sufficient work
incentives were built into the policy and the minimum wage or the
Earned Income Tax Credit were raised substantially at the same time.
The poverty line for a family of three passed $8,500 in 1985 (and passed
$11,000 for a family of four) while the minimum wage remained at
$6,800. Even with the few hundred dollars of food stamp eligibility that
a family of three with one person working at the minimum wage would
retain, an $8,500 cash guarantee would be more attractive than a $6,800
job for any worker who calculated the matter strictly on the basis of the
money (the surprise being that some people would continue working
anyway).
In order to encourage the head of a household of three or four to
work at a minimum wage job, assuming an income guarantee at the pov-
erty line and no change in the minimum wage, the income guarantee
would have to be calibrated with wages so that the total return on work-
ing plus income supplementation would exceed the guarantee received by
a person not working. 194 Other relevant policy responses to accomplish
this would be an increase in the minimum wage or, perhaps more practi-
cally as a political matter, an increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit,
which currently adds about $800 to the income of the minimum wage
worker. 195 These steps, properly calibrated, would eliminate the work
disincentive effect of defining "survival" at the poverty line.
The problem with the foregoing analysis, in the context of a discus-
sion of what a court might do, is that it is complex. Given current reali-
194. Suppose, for example, an income guarantee of $11,000 for a family of four, and that
the question is how to supplement the income from a minimum wage job in order to make sure
working is more attractive than relying totally on the cash transfer. We would need to take
into account the costs of working and we would need a formula which "taxes" away the bene-
fits as more money is earned. Suppose, therefore, that the cost of transit, lunch, and required
uniforms was $1,500 annually, and suppose (as was the law until 1981) the worker could
"keep" one-third'of his net earnings. The $6,800 from the minimum wage job would be re-
duced by the $1,500, then by $1,767 (one-third of $5,300). The $3,533 remaining would then
be deducted from the $11,000 guarantee so the family of four would receive income supple-
mentation of $7,467 and its total net income (exclusive of the expenses of working but before
payroll taxes and income tax) would be $12,767. This should be sufficient to encourage the
head of household to accept a minimum wage job.
195. I.R.C. § 32 (West Supp. 1987).
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ties concerning wages, income guarantees which approach the poverty
line will necessitate fairly complicated work incentive structures, and
these in turn may go beyond what a court, even the Supreme Court, feels
comfortable in ordering.
In light of the complex interplay between income guarantees and
work, a judicially manageable "survival" income might be defined at
sixty percent of the poverty line at present. As indicated earlier, this is
surely not the "right answer," but it is a "right answer." It is a level
which would minimize work disincentive effects, given that the minimum
wage is currently about sixty-five percent of the poverty line for a family
of four and about eighty percent for a family of three, and that such
families would retain some hundreds of dollars of food stamp eligibility if
they had a minimum wage worker. In addition, sixty percent of the pov-
erty line is the current approximate median payment among the states
for AFDC and food stamps combined, so that a definition of "survival"
at sixty percent of the poverty line based on current data would result in
increased transfer payments in half the states. Finally, a guarantee at
sixty percent of the poverty line is sufficiently low that it could encom-
pass the extension of aid to those not currently eligible without enormous
definitional difficulty.
The foregoing is not impracticable. Some will be reluctant to allow
the courts to make Congress or the states appropriate money, but despite
such reluctance there is ample precedent for this kind of order by a
court. 196 Such an order would not have serious unforeseen and unfore-
seeable consequences, and it is far from massively redistributional. In-
deed, the income of those currently on welfare and food stamps in half
the states, including many states where there are many homeless and
hungry people, would not even be affected.
C. Specifics of the Decree
How would the decree be structured? Suppose the lawsuit had been
brought in Mississippi, which currently pays $120 a month in AFDC for
a family of three, or sixteen percent of the poverty line. With food
stamps such a family receives $311 a month ($3,732 annually), or forty-
four percent of the poverty line. The court would be ordering that
AFDC be raised to the point where the annual total of $5,142 in AFDC
payments and food stamps combined would be at sixty percent of the
poverty line. Mississippi is a state which is entitled to seventy-eight per-
196. Cf Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976) (describing the development of public law litigation and the emerging remedies).
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cent reimbursement from the federal government under the current
AFDC structure,197 so the order would result in Mississippi's legislature
having to increase AFDC benefit levels in the state, with commensurate
federal reimbursement.
So far, so good. But Mississippi does not have AFDC-TP, 19 and
there is no such thing as a federal program of assistance to nonelderly,
nondisabled individuals and childless couples. Yet my argument has
been for a "survival" income for all, not one that depends on how many
parents are present in the home or whether there are children.
Here is where the going gets a little trickier, although those who are
similarly situated but not eligible at all are even more totally deprived of
assistance than those who are receiving the current inadequate payments.
Moreover, judicially expanding the list of those who are eligible is not
unprecedented-the Court has expanded eligibility when a particular
classification, especially a gender classification, was found to be inva-
lid. 199 Expanding cash assistance from its present limited categories to a
principle based solely on need is a larger jump than any taken by any
court so far, but it can be done. The court will have found that AFDC in
Mississippi is unconstitutional for some or all of the reasons argued ear-
lier. The remedy must necessarily involve effectively rewriting the stat-
ute as it applies in Mississippi. The court need not do this itself,
unilaterally and unaided. It can ask the assistance of the parties both
federal and state. At sixty percent of the poverty line the design ques-
tions will not be insuperable.
D. Is Judicial Intervention Really Desirable?
Having "proved" that a limited judicial decree which when applied
nationally would have the effect of increasing the income of millions of
people is legally sound and practicable, is it desirable?
The answer is no, it is not desirable. The better response to poverty
is legislative. A full antipoverty strategy is far more complex than any
court, however activist, would have the capacity to handle. For complete
and appropriate relief, legislative "rights" must be created.
Even if giving a lot more money to the poor were a complete anti-
197. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1982) and applicable regulations.
198. AFDC-UP is for unemployed parents. It is a special program created in 1961 which
provides assistance to unemployed, two-parent families. See STAFF OF HOUSE WAYS AND
MEANS COMM. supra note 28, at 366.
199. E.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (AFDC requirement that unem-
ployed parent and principal wage earner be the father in order to establish a family's eligibility
is unconstitutional; rather than invalidating the program, the Court ordered an expansion of
the definition of eligibility).
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poverty strategy, we have already examined the problems involved in try-
ing to accomplish this judicially, especially with reference to the
necessary steps that would have to be taken to make the system congru-
ent with the facts of life in the work place.
More fundamentally, however, giving more money to the poor, as
an antipoverty strategy in and of itself, unaccompanied by other reme-
dies, is not good social policy. It would in fact increase the degree of
chronic dependency absent other, accompanying policies. The govern-
ment's role in a complete strategy against poverty among the nonelderly
nondisabled must also involve the creation or stimulation of more jobs in
the private sector, the possible creation of more public jobs or more jobs
financed with public funds, 2°° an increase in the minimum wage or the
Earned Income Tax Credit or both, increased funding for child care,
strong antidiscrimination policies, and investments in education, train-
ing, health care, and housing for low-income people. Adequate cash
assistance is a sine qua non but it must be accompanied by all of the
foregoing. (I would add, though, that if government is unwilling to take
the steps necessary to put people to work, it should pay them a minimum
income. Dependency is better than starvation.)
These steps are not the stuff of judicial decrees. What I have de-
scribed is in its totality the stuff of legislative and executive action,
although, obviously, bits and pieces can be and have been appropriate
subjects for litigation. Having a court intervene in the matter, even in the
relatively limited way I have suggested, emphasizes cash transfers unduly
as a substantive matter and distorts ideal relationships among the
branches of government.
The problem, though, is that the other branches are not about to
act. Once again we are confronted with a less than ideal set of choices
and, while it seems terribly pessimistic, we may still be confronted with
an unresponsive Congress by the time the kind of litigation I suggested is
brought before a more responsive Supreme Court. Under these circum-
stances it seems to me that there is no alternative but to use the courts as
soon as there is any likelihood that they will be responsive.
Using the courts when the legislature is unresponsive has a value
beyond the net benefit achieved in terms of limited relief initially ob-
tained. History suggests that judicial involvement can spark legislative
reverberation (and sometimes retaliation, to be sure). The Supreme
200. There is an additional subquestion as to whether these would be permanent, career
jobs doing things the taxpayers need done but are not now investing in, or temporary jobs
performing needed tasks for the additional purpose of tiding people over until they can find
permanent employment.
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Court's involvement in race cases was surely one of the cornerstones in
the foundation that underlay the great civil rights legislation of the
1960s. A declaration from the Court of a right to survival income might
evoke a resonating legislative response.201
IV. Interim Litigation Strategies
This Essay has suggested that there are theories with some under-
pinning in traditional doctrine to support a judicial declaration of a con-
stitutional right to a "survival" income. Significant legislative action
dealing with poverty is not imminent, and an approach through litigation
may therefore be a strategic necessity at such time as the Supreme Court
becomes more receptive.
At present, however, neither leap forward is about to occur. What
can advocates do in the meantime? The major areas for activity are mul-
tiple, and include pursuing all possible initiatives at all levels of govern-
ment and encouraging private responsibility and activity as well.
But incremental litigative steps can be pursued, too. These may
bring concrete benefits and also have a secondary benefit by enhancing
the later receptivity of the Supreme Court to addressing the problem of
survival.
The state courts are an important theatre for such activity. Individ-
ual state constitutions may provide specific language not present in the
Constitution of the United States, one state may be influenced by what
another has done, and ultimately the Supreme Court may be influenced
by what a number of states have done.
The Supreme Court has for some years been encouraging states to
utilize state sources of law to go beyond what is required by the federal
constitution. The suggestion has come from both left and right on the
Court, with liberals encouraging it as a partial antidote to the Court's
conservatism and conservatives espousing it as a kind of judicial "new
federalism" 20 2 (although the conservatives have done it with tongue a bit
201. Cf Michelson, One View of Rawls, supra note 3, at 1013-15 (suggesting means of
potential judicial impact upon legislative initiative).
202. See, eg., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982), where
Justice Stevens, speaking for a unanimous Court and citing Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977)), stated the following:
As a number of recent State Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, a state court is
entirely free to read its own State's constitution more broadly than this Court reads
the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor
of a different analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee.
See also Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 728 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,
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in cheek, striking down state forays that were not accompanied by an
explicit, plain statement of reliance on state law as the basis for the state
court decision).
20 3
Moreover, the Court is influenced by what states do. Technically
speaking, what the states do with their constitutions is irrelevant to the
meaning of the federal Constitution. In practice, however, the Court
pays attention. Another logic intervenes. Notwithstanding Attorney
General Meese, a broad spectrum of liberals and conservatives agrees
that the Constitution is a living document, rooted strongly in history, to
be sure, but one that acquires new applications of its text as times
change. If the states are properly viewed as laboratories, then what hap-
pens to the successful results of the experiments? When the Court sees
that a state approach has "worked," it sometimes adopts it regardless of
differing textual language or previously conflicting interpretation.
The history of the exclusionary rule is a case in point. In Wolf v.
Colorado,2°4 Justice Frankfurter said "we cannot brush aside the experi-
ence of states" which had not deemed it necessary to have the exclusion-
ary rule.20 5 He specifically reviewed the history of state response since
Weeks v. United States20 6 had adopted the exclusionary rule in federal
prosecutions, and found the number that had adopted the Weeks rule
(sixteen) to be inconclusive.20 7 Twelve years later the Court reversed it-
self and decided Mapp v. Ohio.208 Justice Clark said the state experience
was "not basically relevant, ' 20 9 but not until after he had made a point of
saying that over half the states that had considered the exclusionary rule
had adopted it in whole or in part and that experience had shown other
remedies to be ineffectual. 210
Batson v. Kentucky,211 decided in 1986, is also illustrative. The
Court had held in 1965, in Swain v. Alabama,212 that a prosecutor's use
of peremptory challenges to remove all blacks from the jury did not vio-
376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1966) (Black, J.,
speaking for the Court); New State Ice House Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Burger, The Interdependence of Our Freedoms, 9 AKRON L. REV.
403 (1976).
203. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983).
204. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
205. Id. at 31-32.
206. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
207. Wolf 338 U.S. at 29.
208. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
209. Id. at 653.
210. Id. at 651.
211. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
212. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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late the rights of a black defendant even if it could be shown that the
prospective jurors were removed because they were black. In the late
1970s, beginning in California, 213 states began using their own constitu-
tions to fashion a different approach, which essentially shifts the burden
to the prosecution to show that the challenges are specifically relevant to
the case once the defense shows that those excluded are members of a
group cognizable as part of the representative cross section of the com-
munity required for a fair trial. In a clear instance of "horizontal federal-
ism,"' 214 the California lead was followed by Massachusetts, 215
Delaware,216 Florida,217 and New Mexico. 218 Each state cited the Cali-
fornia decision. When the issue finally returned to the Supreme Court in
Batson, it proceeded to adopt an approach like that of the California
court, and Justice Powell specifically cited and credited the state develop-
ments as part of the evolution that had occurred.219 The horizontal fed-
eralism was followed by a vertical, reverse federalism.
Advocates have followed a somewhat similar strategy in the area of
education. The Court's 1973 decision in Rodriguez was by no means the
end of litigative efforts to attack inequitable educational financing. In-
stead the focus necessarily switched to an exclusive concentration on
state constitutions. A number of successes have been recorded, 220 with
many of the decisions relying "horizontally" on what sister states had
done under their own constitutions. 221 The horizontal strategy has also
been used successfully to obtain state constitution-based decisions strik-
ing down school registration and textbook fees.
222
213. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
214. G. TARR & M. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM xi-xxiii (1982).
215. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979).
216. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986).
217. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1984).
218. State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
219. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1714-15.
220. Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Dupree v. Alma School Dist.
No. 30 of Crawford County, 279 Ark 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano
I1), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 979, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977);
Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303
A.2d 273, cert. denied sub. nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Seattle School Dist.
No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 225
S.E.2d 859 (1979); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); Washakie County
School Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824
(1980).
221. E.g., Herschler, 606 P.2d at 332 (citing precedents from California, New Jersey, and
Connecticut).
222. Bond v. Ann Arbor School Dist., 383 Mich. 693, 700, 178 N.W.2d 484, 487 (1970)
(citing Paulsen v. Minidoka County School Dist. No. 331, 93 Idaho 469, 463 P.2d 935 (1970));
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These education decisions have a number of relevant implications,
beyond similar suits in additional states. One, most obviously, is that, as
it did in Mapp and Batson, the Supreme Court will revisit the issue at
some point, based on the "laboratory" findings of the states. It should be
instructive to the Court that Governors and legislatures have responded,
without creating constitutional crises, to state court orders that they
restructure their state's system of educational finance. This will certainly
alleviate one of the Court's concerns, stated or unstated. Indeed, as indi-
cated earlier, the Court has in recent years spoken about education in a
tone rather different from much of what it said in Rodriguez, even
though the cases are distinguishable.22 3 So it is not at all unrealistic to
suggest that, even now, education is going through a period of ripening at
the state level which may bear fruit in the Supreme Court.
The recent wave of state educational reform statutes has created an-
other potential avenue for litigation in the state courts.22 4 Much of this
litigation will be based on the state statutes, arguing essentially that the
states have set up new educational standards and requirements and have
not provided the funds necessary for children, especially poor children,
to be able to comply. But state constitutional provisions will undoubt-
edly play a role in such litigation, too, reinforcing the plaintiffs' claims of
statutory rights. And success in a new wave of educational reform cases
will reinforce the climate for a more sympathetic Supreme Court re-
sponse for claims of educational rights of one kind or another.
This process in the realm of education relates to the survival issue as
well, especially when courts discuss education in terms of its necessity for
political participation and economic self-sufficiency, as the Washington
Supreme Court did in state school finance litigation. 225 If advocates were
to focus especially on including "survival" arguments in their educa-
tional-equity litigation, they might as a side effect create a foundation for
"survival" income litigation. Perhaps it will soon be timely for litigators
to bring a survival-income lawsuit under the state constitution in a juris-
diction which has an especially aggressive court, particularly if that court
Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School Dist. 18, 548 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1977)
(citing Dowell v. School Dist. No. 1, 220 Ark. 828, 250 S.W.2d 127 (1952)); Board of Educ. v.
Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 186-87, 222 N.W.2d 143, 147 (1974) (citing Hamer v. Board of Educ.
of School Dist. No. 109, 47 Ill. 2d 480, 265 N.E.2d 616 (1970)).
223. E.g., Papasan v. Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
224. See REPORT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., POVERTY & JUSTICE PROGRAM 14-16 (1987) (proposing a pro-
gram of litigation to enforce rights and obligations created by recent state educational reform
statutes).
225. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 517-18, 585 P.2d 71, 94-95
(1978).
[V/ol. 39THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
DUTY TO THE POOR
has already responded favorably to education litigation premised in part
on the idea that education is fundamental to survival.
226
The need of shelter for the homeless is another area of litigation that
may ultimately prove relevant to the securing of a right to a survival
income. As with education, this strategy is developing under state con-
stitutions and statutes in the face of Supreme Court pronouncements that
nothing in the federal constitution guarantees any right to shelter.
227
The primary focus of litigation for the homeless so far has been in
New York. The litigative strategy in New York initially produced a con-
sent decree benefitting homeless single men, 228 and this was followed by
litigation extending the decree to single women on an equal protection
basis.229 In May of 1986 McCain v. Koch,230 a complicated piece of liti-
gation relating to homeless families, reached a decisional phase in the
Appellate Division after a flurry of grants and denials of preliminary in-
junctions, restraining orders, class certification motions, and the like.
While the outcome is complex, the opinion stands for the proposition
that there is some kind of right to shelter within the framework of rele-
vant federal and state statutes and regulations, and under the New York
State Constitution.
231
Not surprisingly, advocates have been busy trying to develop a hori-
zontal strategy. The West Virginia Supreme Court declared a right to
shelter under state statutes,232 and trial courts in Atlantic City, New
Jersey233 and Hartford, Connecticut have entered orders on behalf of the
homeless.234 Litigation pending in Los Angeles is already credited with
resulting in increased aid for the homeless.
235
The New York Appellate Division's recent opinion in McCain v.
Koch illustrates the promise and the pitfalls in the implications of right-
226. But see infra text accompanying note 40 (discussion of another type of obstacle, as,
raised in Tucker v. Toia).
227. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); see also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
142 (1971) (upholding art. XXXIV of the California Constitution, which requires local refer-
endum vote before any low-rent housing project can be built).
228. Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y., Aug. 26, 1981).
229. Eldridge v. Koch, 98 A.D.2d 675 (1983).
230. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198 (1986).
231. Basler, Ruling Widens Shelter Rightsfor Homeless, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1986, at B1,
col. 6.
232. Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. 1983).
233. Matichea v. Atlantic City, No. L-8306-84E (N.J. Super. Ct., Atlantic County, Nov.
30, 1984), reprinted in 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1341 (1985).
234. Lubetkin v. City Manager of Hartford (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1983), reprinted in
18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1257 (1985).
235. Werner, Homelessness: A Litigation Roundup, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1255, 1258
(1985).
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to-shelter litigation. The court found it "likely that plaintiffs will succeed
on their claim that NY Constitution article XVII obligates defendants to
provide emergency shelter for homeless families. ' 236 Article XVII is
critical to the "survival" discussion here. It is not a provision about shel-
ter per se, but about need: "The aid, care and support of the needy are
public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its
subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature
may from time to time determine. ' 237
The appellate division's reference to Article XVII is promising, ex-
cept that the court was then constrained to point out that Tucker v.
Toia 238 and In re Bernstein v. Toia,2 3 9 earlier holdings of the New York
Court of Appeals, stand in the way of a court ordering a specific mini-
mum level of relief under article XVII. In Tucker the court did say that
article XVII "unequivocally prevents the legislature from simply refusing
to aid those whom it has classified as needy." However, it also said the
same provision "provides the legislature with discretion in determining
the means . . . the amount of aid, and in . . . defining the term
'needy.' "240
The appellate division in McCain took a fairly unusual step follow-
ing its explication of Tucker and Bernstein. The court noted that "the
inability of courts to set even minimum standards ... is discouraging,
saddening, and disheartening," and added that "it is time for the Court
of Appeals to reexamine and, hopefully, change its prior holdings in this
area."
24 1
Tucker and Bernstein were decided in 1977, not too long after the
Supreme Court's strong negative signals in Dandridge v. Williams 242 and
Jefferson v. Hackney,243 and before the downward spiral in the status of
the poor that has been a major premise for the arguments in this Essay.
Perhaps it is not too much to hope that the New York Court of Appeals
will see things differently in light of the visibility of the crisis of homeless-
236. McCain, 117 A.D.2d at 214-15.
237. N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1.
238. 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977).
239. 43 N.Y.2d 437, 373 N.E.2d 238, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1977).
240. 43 N.Y.2d at 8, 371 N.E.2d at 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
241. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 216 (1986).
242. 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that a state does not violate the equal protection as
long as the differences in the way various AFDC recipients are treated are rationally based);
see also Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976) ("Welfare benefits are not a fundamental
right, and neither the State nor the Federal Government is under any sort of constitutional
obligation to guarantee minimum levels of support.").
243. 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (holding that differences in welfare benefits do not violate the
equal protection clause as long as the difterences are rationally based).
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ness and the deterioration in the situation of the poor of which it is a
part.
Conclusion
Anyone who argues that the poor are now fully heard in Congress
and the state legislatures has not examined the history of their situation
since 1978. A lack of political representation does not in itself create
constitutional rights. It does help, however, to justify a decision by a
court that it is now institutionally appropriate to involve itself. In my
view we are going to see a deterioration in the situation of the poor until
there is judicial intervention to change the equation. The votes are not
there on the Court now. That is unfortunate. Millions of the poor are
now facing survival questions that they did not face less than a decade
ago. They should be able to look to the courts for help.

